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Stay out super late tonight 
Picking apples, making pies 
Put a little something in our lemonade and take it with us 
We're half awake in a fake empire 






FOG OF WAR: 
British Theatrical Responses to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq in an 




This thesis examines the “post-truth” political environment through a 
retroactive exploration of issues surrounding the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and 
how these were depicted on the British stage. By presenting “post-truth” 
politics as an extension of Giorgio Agamben's theories on the “State of 
Exception”, this thesis aims to analyse how political theatremakers have 
attempted to depict and critique political exceptionalism on stage. A second 
field of enquiry is to examine how these theatremakers differentiate their 
representation and how they disseminate “truth” from the ‘exceptional’ 
institutions that they intend to critique. The plays specifically covered in this 
survey include David Hare’s Stuff Happens, Richard Norton-Taylor’s Justifying 
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THE GULF BETWEEN FACT AND FICTION 




Post-truth politics is an emerging concept in broader social and political 
discourse in the wake of Brexit and the 2016 US Presidential election. Both of these 
events were noted for controversial campaigns run by political actors who, in an 
attempt to sway potential voters, made multiple claims that “displayed substandard 
levels of factual accuracy” and created a culture “that distrust[s] experts and the 
mainstream media” (Rose 556; Schmidt 249). Mark Andrejevic argues that the 
political opacity shown throughout these campaigns was demonstrative of the ‘post-
truth’ political era, wherein political powers do not “propose an authoritative 
counter-narrative” but rather use a multitude of media platforms to  
engulf any dominant narrative in possible alternatives, to highlight the 
indeterminacy of the evidence by promulgating endless narratives of 
debunkery and counter-debunkery: not to “cut through the clutter” but, on 
the contrary, to suck critique into the clutter blender; not to “speak truth to 
power” but to highlight the contingency, indeterminateness, and, ultimately, 
the helplessness of so-called truth in the face of power. (Andrejevic 9) 
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Post-truth politics, therefore, render truth as a political tool, where truths can be 
invented despite lacking evidence, and furthermore create an environment wherein 
it is difficult to determine what is fact and what is fiction.  
 
While the term ‘post-truth’ might be part of the contemporary zeitgeist, it 
originated during the George W. Bush administration, which had also been accused 
of a similar lack of transparency regarding truth claims. Eric Alterman coined the 
term in When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and its Consequences, a 2004 
analysis of Bush’s foreign policy, where he described the US government as 
operating within a “post-truth political environment” (305). The Bush administration 
was criticised for its decision to initiate the Second Gulf War in 2003, a decision 
based on questionable claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. 
When these weapons were not found, the administration, instead of “providing a 
‘dominant’ narrative of what had happened, did its best to exploit the fog of war to 
throw up a series of often contradictory explanations” ranging from humanitarian 
reasons to eliminating Al Qaeda (Andrejevic 6).  
 
What this state of affairs illuminates is that citizens in democratic societies 
exist in a world of simulacra, in which it is difficult to discern between ‘objective’ 
truth and the realities concocted by their political leaders. This state of affairs led 
Naomi Klein to label 2003 the “Year of the Fake”, as it was 
a year that waged open war on truth and facts and celebrated fakes and 
forgeries of all kinds. This was the year when fakeness ruled: fake rationales for 
war, a fake President dressed as a fake soldier declaring a fake end to combat 
and then holding up a fake turkey. An action movie star became governor and 
the government started making its own action movies, casting real soldiers like 
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Jessica Lynch1 as fake combat heroes and dressing up embedded journalists as 
fake soldiers. Saddam Hussein even got a part in the big show: He played 
himself being captured by American troops.  
A prevailing theme of Klein’s “Year of the Fake” is performance: falsities 
masquerading as truths, George W. Bush announcing ‘Mission Accomplished’ in a 
staged moment wearing a fighter pilot ‘costume’, Saddam portraying a living 
embodiment of the ‘Axis of Evil’ threatening America. Sara Brady agrees that the 
Bush Administration's deception of the public was created through performance. 
Appealing to Richard Schechner’s theories on “make-belief”, Brady argues that the 
Bush White House performed in a manner “[in] which the audience are supposed to 
believe that what they are seeing and hearing is real” (2).  
 
The intermeshing of politics and performance is not only a concern for the 
health of democratic societies that depend on the flow of accurate and non-partisan 
information to function, but also “provide[s] the grounds for an extension beyond 
the rule bound universe” on behalf of our political leaders (Hughes Performance in a 
Time of Terror 2). The co-opting of performance as a tool for deception by political 
leaders allows them to behave exceptionally (fighting unjust wars) and, I contend, is 
also exceptional behaviour (the act of lying). The term exceptional is used in 
reference to Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s writings on the state of 
exception. Agamben states that in a state of exception the sovereign determines their 




1 Jessica Lynch was a 19-year-old private who the Bush administration declared had been rescued by 
American forces from an Iraqi hospital where she was being held hostage, mishandled and abused. In 
an interview with Diane Sawyer it became apparent that not only did her Iraqi captors not mistreat 
Lynch, the rescue conducted by American forces did not occur. 
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Using Agamben’s theories on the state of exception as a conceptual 
framework, the question that will be addressed in this thesis is how can 
theatremakers critique politicians’ exceptional behaviour without resorting to 
exceptional behaviour themselves? Theatre has always been a place of exception, 
albeit different to the one described by Agamben. Barbara Formis argues that 
theatre’s “state of exception is produced on condition of isolating the stage from the 
surrounding world: the individuals acting on stage are supposed to comport 
themselves as if no one were watching” (183). For instance, Brutus can kill Caesar on 
stage but we know that no real crime has been committed. However, if theatre 
creates work that tries to break that isolation from the surrounding world, by 
offering counter narratives to debunk those offered by political elites, should 
theatremakers not ensure that their own work reveals its own constructedness and 
mediation? In short, if theatre is being co-opted by political actors, how does the 
artist ensure they are not guilty of the same manipulation of truth as the politician 
they are trying to hold to account? I will look at this issue by examining work of 
three British playwrights, namely David Hare, Richard Norton-Taylor and Caryl 
Churchill, and how they responded to the ‘post-truth’ political environment that 
clouded the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I will examine how these playwrights attempted 
to challenge duplicitous political power through their work, while also evaluating 
their attempts to disrupt their own work being read as a definitive rendering of the 
‘objective truth’. Using Agamben’s theories on the state of exception as a frame, I 
will examine how these theatremakers critique exceptional sovereign behaviour 
while also examining how they diminish or reveal their own exceptional relationship 
to the truth.  
 
1. Public Justifications 
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Before an examination of the British theatrical response to the Invasion of Iraq 
can occur, it is important to contextualise the invasion itself. Much has been written 
about the Bush administration’s success in selling the public on the Iraq war (Coe 
307). In preparing the public for an invasion of Iraq, the British and American 
governments focussed upon three key points. Firstly, to create links between the 
events of 9/11 and Iraq. Secondly, to implicate Iraq in the possession of weapons of 
mass destruction. Finally, to emphasise Saddam Hussein’s human rights abuses 
implying that intervention was needed for humanitarian reasons (Bahador et al. 6). 
These divergent justifications were found in a declassified internal memo from the 
US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, dated 17 November 2001, nearly two 
years before the invasion, in which he calls for an “influence campaign” over the 
American public to build the “momentum for regime change” in Iraq. In a bullet-
pointed list he ponders the public justification for war against Iraq: 
How Start? 
● Saddam move against Kurds in the North? 
● US discovers Saddam connection to Sept. 11 or anthrax attacks? 
● Dispute over WMD inspections? 
○ Start now thinking about inspection demands. (“U.S. 
Department of Defense Notes from Donald Rumsfeld”) 
Rob Johnson argues that these divergent justifications were put forward to conceal 
the hidden agendas of the Western powers which he believed were: to mitigate the 
possibility of a follow up attack to 9/11 and to exert American supremacy, to 
democratise Iraq by subscribing to democratic peace theory which stipulates that 
democracies are less likely to pursue aggressive policies against each other, to exert 
American authority in the region, by making up for “unfinished business in Iraq” 
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and the belief that Iraq represented a significant threat to their allies and their energy 
reserves; the US and UK desired ‘energy security’ (346-347). 
 
During the build up to the Iraq War, Johnson argues that the Bush 
administration managed public perception, as he states that the “Iraq War was an 
information war as well as a kinetic one, and the media element began long before 
the fighting” (342). Johnson argues that through a sophisticated handling of the 
media and public perception, nation states can make conflict seem inevitable or 
appear to fit within the concept of ‘Just War Theory’ through creating an illusion that 
military action is for the ‘greater good’. This can be done in a number of ways such 
as promoting 
selective reports [or] a number of selected experts including official spokesman 
who appear to be ‘journalists’ or independent analysts, and broadcasting de-
contextualized violence by the enemy so it appears mindless or irrational and 
not provoked by one’s own side [...] a simplification into ‘them’ against ‘us’ or 
‘good’ versus ‘evil’ [Or by stressing] the inevitability of conflict or 
highlight[ing] the limit on the number of options left, perhaps by emphasising 
how little time there is remaining to secure peace. (344)  
Johnson further asserts that these reports can also create “an atmosphere of fear”, 
stoking public perception against potential targets and justifying conflict (345). In the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks, Johnson points out that there existed a genuine sense of 
fear, therefore political elites did not need to create a sense of danger; they merely 




Johnson’s argument is reinforced by claims by Nancy Snow, a former employee 
of the United States’ Information Agency, who argued that people linked Saddam 
Hussein with the events of 9/11, despite evidence to the contrary, because 
The American people were repeatedly told by the President and his inner circle 
that Saddam’s evil alone was enough to be linked to 9/11 and that, given time, 
he would have used his weapons against us. With propaganda, you don’t need 
facts per se, just the best facts put forward. If these facts make sense to people, 
then they don’t need proof like one might need in a courtroom. (quoted in 
Gutierrez)  
Johnson argues, “the 9/11 attacks offered the United States government [...] 
unequivocal justification for war” (347). This was a clear provocation for war; 
however, there existed a challenge as to how a nation-state could declare war against 
an organisation that existed without borders. Therefore, Johnson argues, the United 
States created a “broad and ill defined” ‘War on Terror’ to exert its justified military 
action against Iraq. The reality, Johnson claims, is that these governments are, 
instead, pursuing hidden agendas (344). 
 
2. Hidden Agendas 
If politicians are promoting public justifications, while pursuing hidden 
agendas, then it follows that these politicians are ‘performing truth’ and ‘co-opting 
performance’ for political ends. Theatremakers therefore find themselves in a 
quandary, wherein performance practices are being appropriated for nefarious 
means. Furthermore, this situation positions politically motivated theatremakers on 
the backfoot about how to respond. This assessment is supported by Susan Buck-
Morss who commented that, after the 9/11 attack, “for us as practitioners of culture, 
business as usual has become difficult if not impossible, because the very tools of our 
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trade […] are being appropriated as weapons on all sides” (63). Sara Brady makes a 
similar argument, suggesting that we  
live in a mediatized era in which politicians are performers, and the best one 
wins: the one who can raise the most money, and persuade enough voters 
where reality lies [...] What is posturing when realities are created through the 
public performances of politicians and pundits?. (xii-xiii)  
Brady identifies that these performances by politicians lead to a double standard, 
where the United States proclaims to be a democracy, while illegally detaining 
people in Guantanamo Bay, holding whistle-blowers like Chelsea Manning in 
solitary confinement and organising bombing raids in countries like Libya. These 
acts are only possible, Brady argues, as “the politician’s performances reign supreme 
because they make people believe that all these acts [...] are patriotic” (xiv). This state 
of affairs is troubling for theatre scholars, Brady argues, as theatre’s use of 
performance allows it to house “murder and vengeance”; however this “lies in the 
agreement by the audience and actor to make believe”, while politicians use 
performance to camouflage the reality of the murder and vengeance they are 
committing (xiv-xv). Unlike the theatre, the political landscape has no agreement 
that we live in the world of make believe.  
 
These performances by the US government will be further discussed in 
Chapter One, alongside an exploration of Italian Philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s 
theories on the state of exception. Agamben contends that there exists a legal black 
hole in the execution of sovereign power. In a time of crisis, the sovereign can use 
emergency powers to operate outside their jurisdiction, free of traditional checks and 
balances. The legal black hole emerges when it comes to questions of who 
determines what is a crisis, what are the limits to these exceptional powers, and 
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when does a time of crisis end? For Agamben, the answer to these questions is not 
bound by law and is in fact in the hands of the sovereign. The sovereign is the one 
who determines the exception. Agamben’s theories gained traction in academic 
discourse through his discussion of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay. He argued 
that in labelling detainees ‘enemy combatants’ Bush had created a legally 
unclassifiable being. While most discussion of the state of exception in the post-9/11 
environment focuses on the treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay, this thesis 
uses the state of exception to discuss the manipulation of truth by politicians and 
how they privilege certain information over other information. It also contends that 
the state of exception is a performative act.  
 
3. The Politicisation of the British Stage 
It would seem by the discussion of the political context of this thesis that the 
area of research seems to be an entirely American phenomenon and that exploring 
the depiction of the truth claims surrounding the Iraq War on the British stage seems 
at odds with that assessment. However, Britain was deeply implicated from the 
outset in the invasion of Iraq. While the British theatres produced work that 
critiqued that invasion of Iraq, this politicisation was sorely lacking from American 
stages.  
 
Allan Havis in his introduction to American Political Plays After 9/11 
commented that “American theatres continued to support soft-edge, social narrative 
over heated, political accusatory tracts”, preferring to stage work that contemplates a 
wounded America recovering a collective trauma from the 9/11 attacks (9). Havis’ 
survey highlights work such as The Guys by Anne Nelson, a fictional account of a fire 
captain who must compose eulogies for eight of his men who lost their lives at the 
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World Trade Centre, or At the Vanishing Point by Naomi Iizuka, the tale of a small, 
white, working-class town facing a changing American identity and economic 
uncertainty at the start of the new millennium. Havis defines this period of 
American political theatre as heralding “America’s perseverance, defiance and 
anxiety” that resists pointed political attacks or questions of truth (10). 
 
However, across the Atlantic the decision to invade Iraq triggered a 
politicisation of the British stage “unparalleled since the Vietnam War” (Megson 
369). According to Guardian theatre critic Michael Billington, political drama had 
previously for “all intents and purposes been dead for the past ten years” (State of the 
Nation 383). Billington uses the term ‘political’ here to describe work that focuses on 
processes of government and political institutions, as opposed to plays that focus on 
identity politics. In January 2003, Billington had admonished the British stage for not 
taking a political stance. The country, including its playwrights, had “sleepwalk(ed) 
towards a possible war with Iraq” (“Should Theatre Be More…”). Five months later 
he was forced to reverse his position when the stage was dominated by political 
material. He cited how three plays that were critical of the Iraq War, Martin Crimp’s 
Advice to Iraq Women, Caryl Churchill’s Iraqdoc and Justin Butcher's The Madness of 
George Dubya, were all being performed at major London theatres at the same time, 
concluding “whatever the ultimate consequences of the Iraq war, it has at least 
shown that theatre possesses a public conscience and a social function” (“Suddenly 
Theatre is More Relevant…”). Chris Megson argued that the British stage was 
politicised in four main ways: 
(1) the proliferation of political satire 
(2) revivals and adaptations that have used Iraq as a presiding text 
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(3) theatrical presentations that have been staged as part of anti-war 
protests and; 
(4) forensic documentary performances that have [...] drawn on 
transcribed verbatim testimony in order to track the political and 
diplomatic momentum towards war. (369) 
The British stage was awash with satires (Justin Bucher’s The Madness of George 
Dubya, Alistair Beaton’s Follow My Leader, Tim Robbin’s Embedded), politicised 
revivals such as Nicholas Hytner’s Henry V which featured embedded television 
cameramen and a focus on televised war coverage, Simon McBurney’s Measure for 
Measure which contained projected imagery from Camp Delta and David Farr’s 
reworking of Gogol, The UN Inspector which drew on the Iraq conflict in its tale of a 
Soviet republic awaiting a UN official. However, Carol Martin argues the “most 
striking feature of political theatre practice in Britain over the past decade is the 
widespread ascendancy of verbatim theatre” (370).  
 
4. New Wars, New Forms 
This rise of verbatim theatre practice coincided with an increasing distrust of 
media images or the words spoken by their politicians. Theatremakers in Britain 
provided not only ammunition for satire but also encourage the rise of a wider form 
of theatre that tried to answer the questions the media could not. Megson argues that 
verbatim theatre was a response to the “profound anxieties not only about the Iraq 
conflict but the media’s projection of politics in an era of infotainment” (371). There 
was a sense that these plays confirmed the anxiety felt by audiences that they were 
not receiving the ‘complete truth’ regarding the Iraq invasion and that these 





But more importantly for this thesis, Megson also argued that verbatim 
theatre plays allowed theatremakers to expose “the performative processes at work in 
the mediation of contemporary political events” and that these plays “have set about 
deconstructing and debunking the careful image construction of those politicians 
who instituted it” (371; emphasis added). Daniel Schulze argues that “trust and the 
loss of trust” was a crucial feature of the post 9/11 British experience, defined by a 
“renewed interest in the debate of political issues and more importantly in truth […] 
because of a prevailing feeling that the public had frequently been lied to” (196-197).  
 
The British public’s distrust of truth was most palpably seen in 2003 when the 
UK witnessed the largest political theatrical event in its history. In February, the 
British ‘Stop the War Coalition’ organised a political demonstration in Hyde Park 
that attracted over one million people which reflected the “deep sense of popular 
unease about the ways in which the resources of the state were being used to make a 
disingenuous case for going to war” (Kerr-Ritchie 205). Jeffrey R Kerr-Ritchie points 
out that the cause of the event was a perception that individuals were being 
deceived by their politicians: “If there was ever a recent historical moment at which 
people saw through the lies and deceit of professional politicians — at which the 
emperor was stark-bollocks naked — it was in those final weeks leading up to the 
invasion of Iraq” (205). Celebrated British playwright Harold Pinter in accepting his 
Nobel Prize for Literature in 2005, addressed these feelings in an essay entitled “Art, 
Truth and Politics”. Criticising contemporary American foreign policy, he argued 
this behaviour was nothing different from the action taken earlier by the US in 
Nicaragua and elsewhere, where 
Hundreds of thousands of deaths took place throughout these countries. Did 
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they take place? And are they in all cases attributable to US foreign policy? The 
answer is yes, they did take place and they are attributable to American foreign 
policy. But you wouldn’t know it. It never happened. Nothing ever happened. 
(13) 
All the while, Pinter claims, this culture of “nothing happened” has been supported 
by a “bleating little lamb tagging behind it on a lead, the pathetic and supine Great 
Britain” (14). 
 
In light of this context, the British stage turned to documentary theatre as a 
method to counter politicians’ claims. Stephen Bottoms argued that “mere dramatic 
fiction has apparently been seen as an inadequate response to the current global 
situation” (57). Jenny Hughes points out that theatre’s pursuit of documentary 
theatre was due to a need 
to establish authentic or reliable frames of reference for thought, feeling and 
action in a highly mediatised society, ‘in an era ruled by theatricality, the 
theatre is rediscovering its true role...: exposing the truth’. When life is more 
theatrical than the stage – when the image and power of imagination have 
engulfed and destroyed the real, the theatre seems to have resorted to an 
empirical engagement with complexities of life and the performance of the 
evidential (“Theatre, Performance and the ‘War on Terror’” 151-152). 
Carol Martin argues that “post-9/11 documentary theatre is etched with the urgency 
of the struggle over the future of the past” (9). Theatremakers are struggling to 
recapture the ‘narrative’ of events from political institutions and “set the story 
straight” (14). Traditionally, the role of recapturing the narrative and holding 
political institutions to account has been the role of journalism. However, according 
to David Edgar, documentary theatre now must take on the role of theatre-as-
	
14 
journalism because of a perception that conventional journalism failed to do its job 
(8). Richard Norton-Taylor and David Hare, two playwrights this thesis will 
examine in detail, both claimed their decision to produce verbatim theatre was 
influenced by funding cuts to investigative and in-depth journalism (qtd. in 
Hammond and Steward 121-122; 63). Billington coined the term ‘Newsak’ to 
describe the perceived quality of contemporary journalism, an informational 
phenomenon that had “replaced the aural wall paper of Muzak” (State of the Nation 
384).  
 
5. Versions of the Truth (The Plays) 
It should be noted that documentary theatre has not been without criticism, 
focussing on how the form promises an illusory connection to the real while not 
acknowledging the form’s mediation, if not manipulation, of testimony and fact 
(Bottoms; Claycomb; Gupta). The ethical issues that are found within verbatim 
theatre are analogous to the wider ethical issues found within the subject of this 
thesis: authors dismantling claims to truth while erecting truth claims of their own. 
A grounding of these ethical issues will be investigated in the first chapter of this 
thesis through a discussion of Giorgio Agamben’s work on the state of exception. 
Agamben’s work is primarily concerned with political power, wherein a sovereign 
can determine when laws can be broken for the great good of society; for example, 
when is it acceptable to mislead the public? However, this chapter makes the case 
that his ideas on the exception can be transferred to theatremakers. While the theatre 
exists in its own state of exception, the rise of this ‘new journalism’ has created an 
anomalous void, or a state of exception, where these works are situated 




After unpacking Agamben’s theory on the state of exception, the following 
three chapters will be devoted to work that explores the questionable truth claims 
surrounding the Iraq War but also works that interact with the public record. 
Chapter Two discusses David Hare’s celebrated work Stuff Happens (2004), a play 
that looks behind closed doors at the Bush administration leading up to the invasion. 
Hare blurs the lines between truth and fiction in his work, blending verbatim 
testimony with imagined dialogue. While his play portrays how the ‘Coalition of the 
Willing’ offered contradictory and changing narratives in the lead up to the invasion 
of Iraq, the play’s construction is also a contradiction, mixing the real with the 
invented. Chapter Three examines journalist Richard Norton-Taylor’s Justifying War: 
Scenes from the Hutton Inquiry (2003), a play that re-enacts the inquiry into the 
suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly, a former UN 
weapons expert in Iraq. Kelly was found dead shortly after being interviewed by the 
BBC. The contents of that interview led to media speculation regarding the reliability 
of the September Dossier, a report commissioned by the British Government that 
claimed Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. The Hutton Inquiry also used 
this investigation to debate the larger context of Kelly’s death, specifically, whether 
Iraq held weapons of mass destruction and whether the invasion of Iraq was 
justified. Justifying War was staged by London’s Tricycle Theatre, which has a history 
of presenting ‘tribunal plays’ that aim to recreate tribunals that are often closed to 
the public. Finally, Chapter Four will examine Caryl Churchill’s Drunk Enough to Say 
I Love You? (2006), which imagines the historical relationship between American 
sovereign political power and the people that are affected by their exceptional 
behaviour, through an abusive relationship between two lovers. Unlike the previous 
two texts, Churchill’s work makes no truth claims, residing purely in the world of 
metaphor. These three texts were selected due to their divergent relationships to the 
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historical record, ranging from strict adherence to the forensic recreation of 
transcripts, in the case of Justifying War, to complete rejection of reality in favour of 
metaphor, in the case of Drunk Enough to Say I Love You?  
 
These three works were selected, not only because they were authored by 
some of the most significant British writers of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century, but also for their differing relationships to the record. Stuff Happens is a 
mixture of verbatim and imagined dialogue, Justifying War is a documentary theatre 
piece that follows strict adherence to the forensic recreation of transcripts to recreate 
as exactly as possible the tribunal that it is restaging, while Drunk Enough to Say I 
Love You? rejects reality entirely in favour of fantasy and metaphor, albeit in a 
manner that references contemporary events.  
 
The divergent responses to the historical record of the three plays selected for 
this thesis allow for a wider analysis of the relationship between a play and its 
author in terms of Agamben’s state of exception. David Hare attempts to disrupt the 
record’s account of the decision-making process leading to the invasion of Iraq by 
imposing his own narrative upon the events. Hare mixes verbatim and imagined 
dialogue based on his independent research - the sources of which he has not 
revealed. Stuff Happens suffers from a troubling authenticity in which Hare’s words 
carry the force of truth without being truthful. It is my contention that Hare is guilty 
of the same deceptive tactics as the politicians he wishes to critique and puts his 
audience in the position of Agamben’s homo sacer, individuals suspended from the 
judicial order, lacking adequate tools to critically engage with the work. Hare 
attempts to use his work’s divergent sources as a legitimate theatrical device to 
uncover clandestine political machinations, when in fact Stuff Happens becomes an 
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exercise in hypocrisy on the part of Hare in which he endows himself with an 
exceptional relationship to the truth.  
 
In comparison, Norton-Taylor sheds light on how, during a state of exception, 
official versions of the truth can become corrupted and suspect. The strict code that 
Norton-Taylor has developed alongside the Tricycle Theatre, such as only using 
dialogue that was actually spoken during the tribunal which Justifying War restages, 
has ensured that his exceptional use of truth claims are mitigated as much as 
possible. Norton-Taylor does not seek to clarify the events surrounding the death of 
Dr David Kelly or the invasion of Iraq with Justifying War, but rather he invites his 
audience to contemplate how truth is created in places where the exception is 
enacted such as courts of law and government tribunals. Not only is the truth lost in 
the cut and thrust of the exceptional government bodies, but also the voice of 
Agamben’s homo sacer is lost, barred from places of truth creation and justice. On one 
hand, my contention that this is a limiting factor in Norton-Taylor’s work to reveal 
the truth behind exceptional political acts. But on the other, Justifying War’s 
commitment to showing exactly what is spoken at government tribunals reveals how 
removed twenty-first century citizens are removed from the truth in their lives and 
the political powers that shape it.  
 
Finally Churchill’s rejection of realism and linearity in Drunk Enough to Say I 
Love You? shows her commitment to the pursuit of new forms that avoid the 
problems inherent in both Hare’s authorship and Norton-Taylor’s self-imposed 
inability to illuminate the path to war outside the events and words of the tribunal 
itself. Churchill’s work functions as an analogy allowing her to simultaneously 
comment on the post-truth world without necessarily suggesting that what she is 
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saying is truthful. Furthermore this allows her play to stay relevant without being 
pigeon-holed as a play about Iraq while allowing her audience to critically analyse 
the post-truth political system. 
 
If the post-truth environment is a result of state exceptionalism, then political 
theatremakers should hold political power to account. However, if in doing so these 
works also wilfully, or unintentionally, mislead their audiences then that creates an 
uneasy ethical dilemma. An environment where the historical record is slippery, and 
where politicians offer an increasingly dubious version of events, not only challenges 
the media and the legislative and judicial branches of government to provide 
sufficient checks and balances, but it also requires theatremakers to be vigilant that 












The political machinations of the Bush and Blair governments in the run up to 
the invasion of Iraq were defined by Jenny Hughes as “a politics of exception [… 
where] declarations of exceptions to the rule, supported the spread of war into new 
territories and the indefinite detention of prisoners of war held without recourse to 
legal representation” (Performance in a Time of Terror 2). While Hughes’ examples of 
politics of exception were carried out in the Middle East and against foreign ‘enemy 
combatants’ in indeterminate spaces such as Guantanamo Bay, politics of exception 
were also enacted closer to home. Judith Butler remarks that the twenty-first century 
Western political environment is coloured with “heightened nationalist discourse, 
extended surveillance mechanisms, suspended constitutional rights, and developed 
forms of explicit and implicit censorship” (xi). Arne de Boever simply comments that 
“the normal rule of law is under attack” (261). The exceptional political actions 
described here are evocative of Giorgio Agamben’s theories on the state of exception, 
wherein the sovereign (or political leaders and their institutions) can transcend the 
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rule of law, purportedly for the good of the body politic. However, instead, of these 
actions being used in exceptional circumstances, Agamben comments that the state 
of exception is now the “dominant paradigm of contemporary politics” and has 
“reached its maximum worldwide deployment” (State of Exception 2-3). This 
environment allows political leaders to have considerable control over their citizens 
and the information that they receive. This chapter examines the post-truth political 
environment discussed in the introduction using Agamben’s writings on the state of 
exception as a research lens. The analysis of Agamben’s work will focus on two 
major points, namely the Roman concepts of iustitium, a suspension of law, and homo 
sacer, an individual whom the sovereign can exclude from the judicial order. These 
concepts will be used to discuss how the state of exception operates, how this 
political environment allows the sovereign to openly deceive its citizens and how the 
state of exception is a theatrical phenomenon. Finally, this chapter examines how the 
state of exception’s performative underpinnings create ethical challenges to artists 
who wish to construct counter-narratives and critique official versions of the truth. 
 
1. The State of Exception 
The state of exception was first conceptualised by political philosopher Carl 
Schmitt. A proponent of Nazi ideology, Schmitt argued in his 1921 book On 
Dictatorship that, in exceptional circumstances, the executive branch should be freed 
from any legislative restraints that would normally apply. These exceptional 
circumstances are determined by the sovereign, a role that Schmitt defines “as he 
who decides on the exception” (1). To put this another way, the sovereign, in a time 
of crisis of their own choosing, can operate outside the law and societal norm by 
consolidating their own power in order to protect law and order. While the majority 
of Schmitt’s work was later discredited because of his links to the Nazi party, 
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Agamben picked up Schmitt’s ideas on the state of exception in his works Homo 
Sacer (1998) and the eponymous State of Exception (2005).  
 
Agamben uses Schmitt as a point of departure, insofar that while Schmitt 
claimed the state of exception was a necessary tool of contemporary statehood, 
Agamben argued that the state of exception represents a dangerous constitutional 
crisis2. It is important to note that the state of exception is different from a state of 
emergency; most nation states have laws regarding what constitutes a state of 
emergency and what additional powers the sovereign can have in such 
circumstances while limiting the length of time these additional powers can be used. 
However, the state of exception “is not a special kind of law; rather, insofar as it is a 
suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept” 
(Agamben, State of Exception 4). A state of exception is not something that is codified 
by law or legalised by the judiciary; it is power taken by the sovereign and not 
endorsed by any other part of a democratic structure. While Schmitt could imagine 
the exception working within a judicial context, Agamben argues that the state of 
exception creates a “space without law” (State of Exception 51). This, Agamben 
claims, is “the paradox of sovereignty [which] consists in the fact the sovereign is, at 
the same time, outside and inside the juridical order” (Homo Sacer 17). If the 
sovereign is the one who can proclaim the state of exception, then they exist outside 
the legal system. However, in functioning as an established role such as President or 
Prime Minister then they are still attempting to exist with the juridical order. The 
state of exception presents the sovereign as operating “inside the legal order and 
outside it, since its power remains effective even when the validity of the existing 
legal or constitutional norms is suspended” (Prozorov 100). The state of exception 
																																																								
2 These issues were part of an ongoing critical dialogue between Schmitt and Walter Benjamin, a 
Jewish Marxist. This dialogue, Agamben addresses in Chapter 4 of State of Exception (52-65). 
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exists in an indeterminate space, which Agamben refers to as a zone of anomie (State 
of Exception 50-51), betwixt and between politics and law. The state of exception is 
dangerous, according to Agamben, as it allows for the creation of “judicial measures 
that cannot be understood in legal terms and the state of exception appears as the 
legal form of what cannot have legal form” (State of Exception 1).  
 
Anomie & Iustitium  
This creates a paradox and is why Agamben argues against Schmitt’s thesis 
that the state of exception can be inscribed into law. The state of exception is not a 
“state of law”, but rather a “space without law” (State of Exception 50-51). Under a 
state of exception the sovereign undergoes an “expansion of powers”, that cannot be 
restrained through legal means, which confers “on the executive the power to issue 
decrees that have the force of law” (State of Exception 5, emphasis added ). These 
decrees are not law, but merely acquire the force of law. They are not laws as they 
have no bearing on the legal order but they are understood and are implemented as 
laws. For Agamben this reduces society to a “kenomatic state” that is defined by “an 
emptiness of law” (State of Exception 5). Within the state of exception, there is 
zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but 
rather blur with each other. The suspension of the normal does not mean its 
abolition, and the zone of anomie that it establishes is not (or at least claims not 
to be) unrelated to juridical order. (State of Exception 23).  
This anomie, Agamben points out, is dangerous as it “threatens radically to alter – in 
fact, has already palpably altered – the structure and meaning of the traditional 
distinction between constitutional forms”; the true reach and limit of sovereign 




He compares the state of exception unfavourably to the Roman doctrine 
whereby decisions taken by the emperor have the value of law “quod principi placuit 
legis habet vigorem [because it pleased the sovereign, it has the force of law]” (State of 
Exception 38). Agamben places the cause of the state of exception in a paradigm of 
Roman law: the iustitium. Loosely translated as a “standstill or suspension of the 
law” (State of Exception 42), this term was originally used in the Roman republic as a 
declaration of a state of emergency by the Senate. However, by the time of the 
Roman Empire, iustitium referred to an anomic period of chaos following the death 
of the emperor and the inauguration of his successor. This was a hiatus of legal 
order, a time in which the law from the previous emperor was both applied and not 
applied, and a new rule of law was still being established by the incoming emperor. 
This state of anomie in turn became a useful tool of the emperor, a state of 
exceptional power which could be turned on and off at will (State of Exception 68). It 
is this state of iustitium, and sense of anomie that Agamben believes to be the 
defining governmental structure worldwide in the twenty-first Century. Stephen 
Humphries describes the iustitium as a liminal space of law, where the law and 
decrees that have the force of law become indistinguishable (680).  
 
Agamben’s primary focus has been how to define the actions and the legal 
consequences of a sovereign during a period of iustitium. He asserts this is an 
“impossible question” to answer and that “if we wanted at all costs to put a name on 
human action performed under conditions of anomie, we might say that he who acts 
under iustitium neither executes nor transgresses the law, but inexecutes it” (State of 
Exception 50). In this context any actions committed by the sovereign are outside the 
legal order; there is no legal framework to judge the actions of the sovereign, 
suggesting that “the state of exception appears as the threshold of indeterminacy 
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between democracy and absolutism” (State of Exception 3). Agamben argues that the 
reason the state of exception is now the predominant form of order is because 
democratic legal systems are designed to subsume all political violence, which 
necessitates regular invocation of the state of exception. For Agamben, a democracy 
protected by emergency powers is not a true democracy and he provides the 
example of the Weimar Republic to support this claim, arguing that there exists a 
short leap from democracy to totalitarianism. 
 
In short, sovereigns choose to behave exceptionally, but the state of exception 
is a political phenomena ”in which all legal determinations are [...] deactivated” 
(Agamben, State of Exception 50). The state of exception exists, Agamben claims, 
purely to bridge the binary between anomie and nomos (law). However when the 
state of exception blurs these, “the juridico-political system transforms itself into a 
‘killing machine’” as the sovereign can commit exceptional acts of violence without 
obstruction or recourse (State of Exception 86).  
 
The Homo Sacer  
When Agamben refers to the political system becoming a killing machine he 
is citing his theory of the homo sacer - a human stripped of legal rights. If the 
sovereign operates exceptionally, the political or juridical order of society is 
suspended. By suspending the juridical order, individuals whose rights are 
transgressed by the sovereign are excluded from the law and in doing so the 
sovereign creates homo sacer or bare life. Agamben lifts the term homo sacer from 
Roman law, wherein if a Roman citizen committed crimes that affronted the gods, 
they were removed from civil society and could be killed by anyone without 
penalty. The homo sacer is an individual who is defined in legal terms by their 
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absence from the legal order; homo sacer are “included in the juridical order solely in 
the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)" (Homo Sacer 8). 
Agamben identifies the sovereign and homo sacer as “the two poles of the sovereign 
exception” (Homo Sacer 110). Both are, for different reasons, outside the law and as 
Nicola Rogers suggests, these poles lie in ‘an unlikely symmetry’ where homo sacer is 
excluded from political life by the mechanisms which the sovereign administers to 
consolidate their power (163). The homo sacer needs to be identified and their 
humanity stripped, to allow the sovereign to consolidate their own power. In this 
instance the exceptional sovereign and the homo sacer are symmetrical and 
correlative phenomena. 
 
Agamben classifies life into two categories: bios, our legitimate political life, a 
person with rights and protected by the law, and zoe, our bare life or animal life, 
given by God, but not protected by the legal system. Homo sacer is bare life that has 
had its bios removed, and is expelled from the world of men. The sovereign can strip 
the rights of individual citizens, exclude them from society and render them, like the 
sovereign, to exist in a zone that is both inside and outside the law. All life and its 
protection and relation to the legal order is based on the whim of the sovereign and 
therefore the state of exception operates as a “sphere in which [the sovereign] is 
permitted to kill without committing homicide” (Homo Sacer, 84). For Agamben, the 
“zoe–bios” distinction, is the "fundamental categorical pair of Western politics" (Homo 
Sacer, 8). Matthew G. Hannah notes that in the twenty-first century the vast majority 
of citizens are now potentially homo sacer and “the salient issue ... is the fact that a 
tiny, organized group may remain unexceptionable” (71 ellipses in original).  
 
 To review, the state of exception is an extension of power by a sovereign in a 
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time of crisis, as defined by the sovereign. The state of exception is not codified by 
law, so the sovereign is operating both within and outside the judicial order. The 
state of exception is an anomalous zone which is hard to define; consequently, it is 
hard to distinguish when the sovereign is operating within the norm or outside of it. 
Finally, the sovereign can reduce citizens to bare life, life stripped of political right, 
which leaves citizens both suspended inside and outside the law as well, where they 
can be exploited or killed. The state of exception is a useful frame in which to 
conceptualise the state’s actions in times of self-imposed crisis.  
 
2. The Reality-Based Community 
How, then, do both the state of exception and Agamben’s ideas on the homo 
sacer and iustitium relate to ideas of state lying and deception? During a period of 
iustitium, state power is separated from the political and judicial order allowing the 
sovereign to behave exceptionally, for example, in passing decrees that have the force 
of law without being law. In the same way a sovereign could behave exceptionally 
through making claims that have the force of truth which are not necessarily truthful. 
For example, the claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction had the 
force of truth, the case made by the British and American governments had the force 
of evidence, but the fact remained that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass 
destruction. Following this logic an exceptional sovereign can allow notions of truth 
to exist in an anomic space whereby their assertions cannot be challenged or verified, 
and where their claims are both truth and fiction at the same time. By privileging 
suspect information with the force of truth, sovereigns are also, in turn, reducing 
their citizens to homo sacer. The sovereign strips their citizens of “the right to receive 
information” from its government unadulterated, a right that is enshrined, for 




Legal scholar Quinta Jurecic explores the relation between truth and the state 
of exception in reference to the behaviour of Donald Trump, suggesting Trump’s use 
of ‘alternative facts’ “places the speaker outside usual systems of evaluating truth 
and meaning, just like the exception places the sovereign outside the space of law… 
[lying] like the declaration of the state of exception, can’t be verified or constrained.” 
A sovereign’s use of information can be seen to be analogous to the treatment of its 
citizens. Like the citizen fluctuating between a state of zoe and bios, legitimate and 
illegitimate life, information fluctuates between truths and falsehoods. In this case 
the sovereign can position themselves as a fount of truth, privileging some 
knowledge over other knowledge, excluding unwanted facts from discussion or 
ignoring facts entirely. A sovereign can give information the force of ‘truth’ without 
it actually be truthful, just as the sovereign can act with the force of law, without 
these actions being within the bounds of the law.  
 
For the sovereign, being able to give information the force of truth is a 
powerful tool for controlling the populace while pursuing hidden agendas. In this 
manner, the sovereign’s exceptional act of lying allows them to pursue further 
exceptional acts. These additional exceptional acts may be hidden from the general 
population or perhaps justified through information circulated by the government 
that has the force of truth. The Bush administration was revealed to be operating in 
this manner, when an unnamed official of the Bush administration, later revealed to 
be Senior Advisor to the White House Karl Rove, criticized renowned political 
journalist Ron Suskind for clinging to a “reality-based community” (Dannert). 
Suskind described the interaction as follows:  
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The aide said that guys like me were 'in what we call the reality-based 
community,' which he defined as people who 'believe that solutions emerge 
from your judicious study of discernible reality.' [...] 'That's not the way the 
world really works anymore,' he continued. 'We're an empire now, and when 
we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—
judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you 
can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors…and 
you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do’. 
Elan Abrell argues that “such creation of ‘new realities’ is the very process that 
drives the war of ideas – the forging of ideas into weapons with which to claim 
power or further entrench status positions” (222). Abrell further suggests that Bush’s 
opponents joked about the term ‘reality-based communities’, labelling Bush and his 
cabinet as  
mentally deficient. These jokes, although perhaps cathartic, failed to 
acknowledge – while unintentionally confirming – the far more disturbing 
implications of the aide’s statement: that power elites do shape reality through 
the war of ideas; that they do deploy their ideologies strategically and 
consciously to achieve political-economic goals; and that a large part of their 
success lies in the fact that their opposition consistently fails to fully recognize 
this even when they explicitly affirm it. Before we can create reality-altering 
ideas of our own, we must fully grasp the Right’s tactics of ideological 
manipulation and how these tactics intermesh with larger political-economic 
processes, such as accumulation by dispossession. (222)  
There is a discrepancy between discernable reality and the reality in which the 




Ole Bjerg and Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen demonstrate how the state of 
exception allows for favourable narratives to be promoted and unfavourable 
narratives to be dismissed, in what they label a “state of epistemic exception” (150). 
They argue that in the case of a twenty-first century homo sacer, a terrorist, that 
accusation and conviction seem to collapse [...] Terrorism is not merely a simple 
crime. It is an offence so serious that it transcends the question of guilt. A 
terrorist is, as it were, so evil that we cannot even determine his guilt in a court 
of law. In turn, he is simply detained indefinitely. (149)  
Bjerg and Presskorn-Thygesen argue the state of epistemic exception is keenly seen 
operating in government bodies, military tribunals or commissions such as The 9/11 
Commission:  
Just as the purpose of military tribunals is to produce some form of quasi-
legality in the treatment of terrorists, part of the purpose of these 
commissions is to produce the official version of an event that is 
subsequently meant to be recorded in the history books (149)  
Bjerg and Presskorn-Thygesen’s conclusion is not that theories that contradict the 
sovereigns’s “are true or that the individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay are 
somehow all innocent”, but that legal procedures for determining the guilt of 
terrorists are an exception from “ordinary procedures for determining guilt” - just as 
the procedures which determine the veracity of claims that are against the official 
version of the truth, differ from how ‘ordinary’ claims are determined (150).  
 
3. Twenty-First Century Camps and “The New Normal” 
Many academics have written about the Bush administration's use of military 
tribunals as an example of the state of exception wherein terrorists, or ‘enemy 
combatants’, are held prisoner habeas corpus, with their rights suspended indefinitely, 
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and claim that the tribunals are indicative of Agamben’s theory on homo sacer 
(Rogers; Humphries; Abrell). However, it is reasonable to contend that the life of the 
twenty-first century citizen who is wilfully misled by their sovereign, life that cannot 
anchor itself to a discernible reality, is also suspended life.  
 
The suspension of life and the wider twenty-first century experience is similar 
to Agamben’s description of a “camp” which he defines as “the space that is opened 
when the state of exception begins to become the rule” (Homo Sacer 168). In this sense 
he is referring to the creation of a “spatial arrangement” that remains outside the 
normal order, specifically referencing the camps of Auschwitz and Guantanamo. 
However, in defining what constitutes a camp, Agamben argues that we must look 
behind the acts committed in the camps to understand the political procedures that 
allow rights to be stripped away: 
The correct question to pose concerning the horrors committed in the camps is 
[...] not the hypocritical one of how crimes of such atrocity could be committed 
against human beings. It would be more honest, and above all, more useful to 
investigate carefully the juridical procedures and deployments of power by 
which human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and 
prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer as a 
crime. (Homo Sacer 171) 
Hannah suggests that while Guantanamo Bay “may represent a space of exception”, 
where sovereign power is “able to dominate life within the walls of the camp” then 
the sovereign must have some level of dominance over “the territory outside the 
walls” of Guantanamo Bay (63). For Hannah, the procedures and deployments of 
power described by Agamben “are not merely ’juridical’ in character; to an 
important extent, they are a matter of concrete territorial control” (63). In this respect 
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Hannah defines “concrete territorial control” as the ways in which the sovereign can 
control our lives so that they can act exceptionally (63-65). These systems of controls 
include border crossing and surveillance systems. I would add to that list systems 
that promote deception and propaganda. The inhabitants of Guantanamo and the 
citizens of the West are both, to different extents, homo sacer. I do not wish to conflate 
the experiences in a concentration camp and experiences in a privileged 
contemporary Western setting. I merely wish to suggest that the way the sovereign 
mediates and disseminates “truth” to a captive populace is also holding them in 
suspension. Those labelled terrorists are exceptional and can be freely tortured, 
while those who are identified as being part of the “reality-based community” can be 
deceived without sanction. Hannah concludes that, against this backdrop, wherein 
citizens are wilfully misled regarding the fact that Iraq possesses weapons of mass 
destruction, evidence is issued that has the ‘force’ of truth and a mass surveillance 
network of domestic citizens is created, in the twenty-first century “the vast majority 
of citizens already are virtual homines sacri” (71). 
 
Davina Bhandar elaborates on this twenty-first century Western experience, 
labelling it the “new normal” of living in “Fortress North America”, wherein citizens 
are controlled through “anxiety, fear, and trauma”(261-263). Citizens are prepared to 
be subjected to this new normal “because it is anticipated that there are potentially 
life altering surprises or challenges hidden around the corner that require careful 
vigilance” (264). The experiences of a citizen in this environment lead them to think 
that these experiences differentiate them from the ‘other’ or, in Agambenean terms, 
zoe - the illegitimate life. A citizen, bios, is prepared to submit to the conditions of life 
dictated by the sovereign while a zoe is not. Hannah argues this creates a system of 
“differentiated” citizenship, where citizens self-police their own actions, through 
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subjecting themselves to background checks or microchipping, in return for greater 
privileges such as increased mobility at border crossings (72). Agamben’s state of 
exception is a binary, that of legitimate life and illegitimate life, but within this 
system described by Hannah legitimate life exists on a spectrum, suggesting that 
citizenship is a tiered dynamic depending on how compliant an individual is with 
the exceptional actions of their sovereign. The experience of this ‘new normal’ 
further extends the state of exception, a perpetual state of emergency, symbolically 
legitimising the actions of the state. In this way the camp of the twenty-first century 
lacks corporeal form, operating on a metaphysical level and is inherently 
performative.  
 
4. The State of Exception and Performance 
The previous sections of this chapter have outlined what constitutes a state of 
exception and have illuminated, in Agamben’s terms, that deception is an 
exceptional act while contextualising this exceptionalism and how it operates in the 
twenty-first century. This section describes the cross-over between the state of 
exception and performance, namely how the state of exception is in itself a 
performance, and outlines how the theatre exists in its own state of exception.  
 
According to Hughes the state of exception is generated through practices of 
performance and theatre which enable the casting of grandiose imagery to legitimise 
and enact expansive powers (“Theatre, Performance and the ‘War on Terror” 149). 
This creation of grandiose imagery in turn allows for further exceptionalism and 
deception. She suggests that “war and terrorism make powerful interventions into 
our social worlds” by capturing the public’s attention. She further argues that these 
events only become “coherent” when interpreted by the top levels of government 
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through “institutionalised imagination”, which in turn authorises the sovereign to 
justify acts of war (150). Exceptionalism rests on performance, the ability to “create 
threats”, “identify frailties” and invent evidence (Performance in a Time of Terror 2). 
Hughes’ lifted the phrase “institutionalised imagination” from the 9/11 Commission 
report which called for the American government to exercise its imagination in 
identifying potential threats to the nation (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States 344). Brett Nicholls agrees, arguing that 
at the most mundane level, the spectacular-democratic State has become 
suspicious of what it cannot see and it explains this ocular obstruction in the 
most violent scenario it can imagine [...] This crisis potential, and the 
production of fear that is associated with it, has become a permanent situation. 
In many respects, this crisis potential engenders today’s spectacular democratic 
State’s increasing control over and command of contemporary subjects (3). 
The sovereign state is prepared to identify and label any potential bogeymen hidden 
in the shadows. The identification of potential threats, in turn, endorses further 
exceptional behaviour, which, for Agamben, creates an environment in which “it is 
impossible to distinguish the transgression of the law from the execution of the law” 
(Homo Sacer 51). 
 
Hughes argues that “performance and exception are intimately linked: a state 
of exception is produced by means of a performance... and thus power is both made 
and contested in an embodied and performative zone that is not securely definable 
or fixable” (“Theatre, Performance and the ‘War on Terror”, 4-5). This description 
evokes Richard Schechner’s idea on the liminal space wherein a person is “betwixt 
and between” (66). For Schechner, performance rests on this idea of liminality which 
is to be inter, to exist between, on the way from something toward something else; 
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being “inter is exploring the liminal” (ix). The sovereign, therefore, goes through 
Schechner’s idea of transportation, wherein the sovereign, the performer, lives a 
double negative which “takes place between not me...not not me” (72). Schechner 
defines this as a performer is not Ophelia, but they are simultaneously not not 
Ophelia. Similarly the actor is not the actor, but they are not not the actor. Like the 
performer who is stuck between the roles of actor and Ophelia, the sovereign is 
stuck between democratic leader and dictator.  
 
In a state of exception a political leader must cast themselves in the role of the 
sovereign, which, for Mark Salter, is inherently performative as the sovereign must 
simultaneously perform “as protector against the collapse of all community” while 
hiding ”the inherent violence in this primary contract” (368). While operating within 
this role, José Muñoz argues that the sovereign “stages the state of exception to 
naturalize and justify unchecked and abusive manifestations of power amid a 
general scene of savage social asymmetry” (138; emphasis added). The exception in 
which the sovereign operates is also performative, insofar as an exception means to 
deny the fixed original identity or understanding of a role or concept and suspend a 
rule-bound universe, creating new identities and understandings that are unfixed 
and ever changing. Sovereign power is something according to Shirin M. Rai that 
must be “constructed and reproduced, in part, through ceremony/ritual through 
which new meanings of power are inscribed” (152). This according to Rai occurs in 
unexceptional sovereignties, for instance in the reopening of parliament after an 
election. These performances and rituals are “deployed both to awe and to put 
beyond contestation the everyday workings of institutions and in so doing secure 
the dominant social relations that obtain within it” (151-152). Through the generation 
of grand imagery described by Hughes above, following Rai’s theory, the sovereign 
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in turn is constructing new meaning of power, the sovereign as the protector from 
the powerful external forces that aim to harm everyday life, and therefore the 
sovereign’s behaviour is unquestionable and beyond reproach.  
 
Hughes’ concludes that the state of exception’s grounding in performance 
raises grave “ethical and political questions” for any theatrical work that wishes to 
respond to exceptional governmental actions (“Theatre, Performance and the ‘War 
on Terror’”, 150). The ‘establishment’ is co-opting the language of performance, and 
in doing so emphasises the exceptional nature of theatre. Barbara Formis points out 
that theatre exists in its own state of exception: 
it is to the extent that the fictive illusion aims at exceeding the constraints of the 
presupposed ‘reality’. A crime accomplished on stage is not immediately 
perceived as such. This state of exception is produced on condition of isolating 
the stage from the surrounding world: the individuals acting on stage are 
supposed to comport themselves as if no one were watching. (182-3).  
Harold Pinter in his Nobel Prize lecture, “Art, Truth and Politics”, outlines how both 
theatre and politics exist within a state of exception regarding each discipline’s 
treatment of truth. Theatremakers due to the nature of the form can be less rigid 
with the truth. Pinter outlines that truth in art is a hazy commodity as “truth in 
drama is forever elusive” and we “stumble upon the truth in the dark” (3). However 
once you have discovered truth in drama, he argues, “sometimes you feel you have 
the truth of a moment in your hand, then it slips through your fingers and is lost“ 
(4). James M. Harding outlines that, “Pinter understands his role as an artist to be 
that of illuminating the elusiveness of truth vis-à-vis an artistic search for it“ (23). 
According to Pinter we understand the stage to be a place where “there are no hard 
distinctions between what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and 
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what is false” (3), which evokes Schechner’s ideas of the “double not”, described 
above. Theatre, to function, depends on the audience investing in this paradox 
where reality and masquerade coincide.  
 
However in politics, Pinter argues, it is unacceptable to allow the real and 
unreal to be blurred together; “as a citizen I must ask: What is true? What is false?” 
(3). For Pinter this uneasy situation allows political power to take advantage of their 
citizens and operate exceptionally as  
the majority of politicians […] are interested not in truth but in power and in 
the maintenance of that power. To maintain that power it is essential that 
people remain in ignorance, that they live in ignorance of the truth, even the 
truth of their own lives. What surrounds us therefore is a vast tapestry of lies, 
upon which we feed. (7) 
Pinter argues that for him to hold both these theories of truth to co-exist 
conceptually, he must draw “a clear line between his understanding of truth as an 
artist and his understanding of truth as a citizen” (Harding 23). As an artist he can 
treat truth as an elusive and malleable substance, but as a citizen he must speak truth 
to power. What becomes problematic, however, is when these two realms start to co-
exist, when the artist and the citizen and these two concepts of the truth begin to 
merge. When theatrical work starts commenting on contemporary events, offering 
and promising an illusory connection to the real, then theatre is, like the truth claims 
of the sovereign, crossing into a state of anomie. That theatrical work exists between 
fact and fiction, between theatre, a form fueled by imagination, and documentary, a 
form fueled by the real. Theatre practitioners operate in a world wherein their work 
can be read as truthful and fictional at the same time and, therefore, should 




The following chapters will survey plays that have different relationships to 
the public record but, in their own ways, attempt to “establish a sense of stability in 
a highly mediatised environment that has distorted information and produced a 
dislocation of a sense of ‘truth’ (Hughes “Theatre, Performance and the ‘War on 
Terror’”, 163). These chapters will examine how these works grapple with the 
exceptional narratives surrounding the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and how their 
authors have attempted to foreground or reconcile the exceptional abilities of 










Donald Rumsfeld, when asked by journalists about the collateral damage in 
the wake of a US bombing raid in Baghdad, replied in a fashion that was 
demonstrative of the exceptional American behaviour regarding Iraq: “stuff happens 
and it’s untidy, and freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and 
commit crimes and do bad things” (qtd. in Loughlin). According to Ian Ward, this 
dismissive, if not callous attitude, is indicative of a theme of “self-delusion, a 
paralysing inability to distinguish reality from fantasy which President Bush and his 
advisers strove to create in the weeks and months that followed 9/11” (179). The 
avoidable deaths of civilians are diminished to ‘stuff’, common everyday 
occurrences. The delusion described by Ward may have been self-delusion but 
Rumsfeld's words were also intended to mislead the American public by 
downplaying and disrupting the nature of US foreign policy and exceptionalism. 
Similar behaviour was demonstrated by politicians in making a case for the invasion 




Stuff Happens opened at the National Theatre in 2004. The three-hour play is a 
chronological reconstruction of the diplomatic process leading to the 2003 Invasion 
of Iraq. Over the course of the play, an ensemble cast portrays 44 real-life political 
figures as well as five fictionalised characters who present ‘viewpoints’ from the 
contemporary public. The play’s linear narrative is made up of many small, sharp 
scenes, allowing actors to play multiple parts in different locations. The main 
characters of Stuff Happens are all recognisable: George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Dick 
Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice. According to Christopher Innes, 
this distinguishes Stuff Happens from other contemporary verbatim theatre pieces as 
“the major figures are named and all instantly recognisable from television and the 
newspapers, being represented doing the things they actually did“(441). 
 
The play combines verbatim dialogue lifted from interviews and speeches 
with fictional dialogue in an attempt to demystify the political process that led to the 
Invasion of Iraq. For Hare, this political process was guided less by honest, candid 
diplomacy, and more by the Bush cabinet’s underhand coercion and manipulation of 
the public and their opponents in the United Nations. The George W. Bush of Stuff 
Happens evokes the role of the Agamben sovereign, carrying out exceptional acts, 
wilfully misleading the public into believing that these very acts are in the name of 
freedom. The opening lines of Stuff Happens, spoken by an actor out of role, 
demonstrate Hare’s belief, that hidden political machinations are responsible for 
forces that shape world events:  
The inevitable is what will seem to happen to you purely by chance. 
The Real is what will strike you as really absurd. 
Unless you are certain you are dreaming, it is certainly a dream of your own. 
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Unless you exclaim - “there must be some mistake” - you must be mistaken.  
(Hare Stuff Happens, 3) 
 
Arguably Britain’s most celebrated living playwright, Hare is best known for 
his ‘state-of-the-nation’ plays that debut at the publicly funded National Theatre in 
London. David Wiles argues that the goal of Hare’s work embraces the ethos of the 
National Theatre; that is, to assist in the shaping of public opinion by using his work 
as a platform for citizens to interact and discuss ideas (211). Stuff Happens reflects his 
philosophy that the function of the theatre is to “put things under a microscope [so 
that] people learn for themselves” (Hare Acting Up, 21); this is achieved Chris 
Megson and Dan Rebellato argue by making “visible historical processes and social 
structures” (249).  
 
Stuff Happens has been celebrated for establishing a coherent narrative on a 
tumultuous time in world politics while allowing its “audience to critically 
interrogate [the case for war] as well as the ethical probity of leading social actors” 
(Hughes “Theatre, Performance and the ‘War on Terror’” 152). Much has been 
written about the exceptionalism of the politicians in Stuff Happens (Sirwah; Gupta; 
Colleran), but the primary concern of this chapter is the exceptionalism 
demonstrated by its author. The play is a combination of both verbatim and 
imagined dialogue but at no point in the play does Hare indicate clearly which parts 
of his play are factual and which are fictional. He has indicated that he conducted 
research and interviews with key sources who were close to the events of the play 
but does not reveal his sources. As Jay Gipson-King points out, what this means is 
that Stuff Happens is operating on three levels of reality: the first being verbatim 
dialogue, the second being informed speculation taken from his unnamed sources 
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and thirdly scenes of pure imagination, where no one knows what really happened 
except for the people who were there (154). The distinction between these levels of 
reality is not acknowledged in his work; the audience is unaware which words are 
verbatim and which are invented. Hare’s truth claims, like that of Bush, carry the 
force of truth without being truthful. What is positioned as fact in reality could be 
hearsay or pure imagination.  
 
Stuff Happens, therefore, exists in an anomic space between fact and fiction, 
and Hare takes on the role of the sovereign, and his misled public, the role of the 
homo sacer. By preventing his audience from critically engaging with his work’s 
construction he entering into an exception relationship with the truth, where his 
verbatim dialogue, research and imagination are all treated with the same level of 
authenticity. Furthermore, like Agamben’s sovereign who exists between the 
executive and the judicial branches of government, Hare blurs the edges of his own 
role and his relationship to his work. Is Stuff Happens (1) a fictional political drama 
by a playwright (2) a verbatim theatre work made by a documentary theatre maker 
(3) a piece of reportage written by a journalist or (4) a historical testimony written by 
a historian? It is my contention that Hare’s authorial relationship with the play is 
somewhere between these four roles which he appears to try to take on all at once, 
without adequately fulfilling the responsibilities of any one role or form. In short, 
Hare is guilty of the same exceptional behaviour regarding his play’s truth claims as 
the political forces he wishes to illuminate.  
 
This chapter will examine how Hare reveals American exceptionalism in his 
play, before discussing how Hare’s own claims about the play give its claims the 
force of truth without being truthful. This will be followed by an exploration of the 
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hybrid nature of Stuff Happens unpacking its fraught relationship with the real, a 
discussion on how this endows Hare’s audience as homo sacer and finally dissecting 
Hare’s own anomic authorial role in relation to the play.  
 
1. Bush’s Rhetoric of Exceptionalism  
The behaviour of the politicians in Stuff Happens mimics the behaviour 
described by Agamben in State of Exception. The main dramatic thrust of the play 
comes from the debates between George W. Bush, who in Agambean terms, takes on 
the role of the sovereign, and his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who attempts to 
reel in his President’s exceptional behaviour. Powell is characterised as the 
“reluctant soldier [...] so inexorably and so comprehensively co-opted into carrying 
out his master’s bidding” while simultaneously attempting to remind Bush that 
“America is a republic not an empire” (Soto-Morettini 316; Colleran 153). Powell is 
the citizen’s proxy, aghast at how his government openly defies domestic and 
international law.  
 
The play alternates between scenes where members of the Bush cabinet say 
one thing in a private meeting and scenes utilising verbatim testimony where the 
cabinet relay a different message to the public. This staging, Jeanne Colleran notes, 
suggests simultaneous plotting and disconnection, with Bush as a kind of wily 
puppet master (151). Members of Bush’s cabinet place themselves outside typical 
government processes, with their primary concern being to engineer an acceptable 
reason to go to war, deceiving not only the American public but also their allies and 
the United Nations. The cabinet are frequently depicted as endorsing information 
with the force of truth without that information being entirely truthful, while the 




For many audience members, the appeal of the play was to demystify the 
events leading up to the Iraq war. Hare suggests that these events were carried out 
by hidden political machinations unbeknownst to a duped public. Colleran points 
out that “Hare really wanted his audience to listen and to hear the rhetoric of 
exceptionalism” from Bush’s cabinet (152). The politicians of Hare’s play 
unashamedly bask in their exceptionalism. Hare’s Bush says, “I’m the commander – 
see, I don’t need to explain. I don’t need to explain why I say things. That’s the 
interesting thing about being the President”, a line that evokes Richard Nixon’s: 
"well, when the president does it, that means that it is not illegal” (Stuff Happens, 10).  
 
The Bush portrayed in Stuff Happens believes that he does not need to justify 
his beliefs or actions to anyone; he is beyond reproach. While debating the need to 
go through the United Nations to make the war ‘legitimate’, Donald Rumsfeld 
argues with Powell about how America exists in a state of exception wherein what 
constitutes legitimacy to the United States is different to other world nations 
RUMSFELD I’ll tell you what’s legitimate. What we do is legitimate. Read 
the American Constitution. It was written by Thomas 
Jefferson and he said - and I’ll remind you of his word - that 
what makes governments legitimate is the consent of the 
people.  
[...]  
We do not need lectures from Europe on how to hold our 
knives and forks. They pretend all the time that they’re upset 
because we’re not consulting. “They’re not consulting”, they 
say! Are you fooled by that? I’m not. Because what they really 
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hate, what’s really bugging them, is not the way we do things. 
It’s that we’re the only people in the world that can do them. 
It’s not our manner, it’s our power. And all they want, all 
anyone wants, is to put a brake on that power. And that is the 
purpose of this exercise. That is the purpose of getting us 
snared up in yet another fucking resolution. (Stuff Happens 
101-103) 
Hare portrays the Bush cabinet as preoccupied with “their desire to remap the 
world, and their belief that executive power can be expanded without 
check”(Colleran 154).  
 
The first target of this ‘remapping’ is Iraq. The cabinet ensures that its executive 
power can be expanded through the manipulation of ‘truth’ and evidence. To invade 
Iraq, the administration need not make the war justified but rather appear justified, as 
clearly depicted in a scene involving Rumsfeld and George Tenet, the director of the 
CIA, discussing inconclusive satellite imagery.  
RICE Everyone see? 
O’NEILL I can see. But – I’m asking: I’ve seen an awful lot of factories 
round the world that look an awful lot like this. What’s the 
evidence, what’s the evidence of what this factory’s 
producing? 
TENET Well, it’s rhythm. 
O’NEILL  Rhythm? 
TENET Rhythm of shipment. Round the clock. In and out of the plant. 
Trucks coming and going all night. The rhythm is consistent. 




RUMSFELD You’re not saying it’s not. 
TENET I’m not. 
RUMSFELD He’s not saying anything. 
TENET Not quite. 
RUMSFELD He’s from the CIA 
They all laugh. (Stuff Happens 14) 
 
Khaled Sirwah argues that Hare’s play reveals a form of “coercive 
diplomacy” which Bush employs to achieve “his own personal agenda”, and which 
“has always been the US’s means for (il-)legal ends” (73). Coercive democracy is 
defined by Alexander George as "the attempt to get a target—a state, a group (or 
groups) within a state, or a nonstate actor—to change its objectionable behaviour 
through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force" (4). While 
coercive democracy is often used as a form of foreign policy, “Bush finds himself 
bound to employ this strategy against all people” including the American public 
(Sirwah 75). Bush’s threats to his own citizens are designed to coerce them into 
supporting Bush’s policies and these threats are created through images that 
represent a threat to the security of the American way of life. In this sense a factory 
that has the appearance of manufacturing weapons of mass destruction is analogous 
to a case for war that appears to be justified. While, in an earlier scene, Bush is 
congratulated by Dick Cheney for using the term “War on Terror” as it is “suitably 
vague”, in another scene Bush asks a journalist to use the term “regime change”, 
instead of “removal” as it “sounds a lot more civil”. This behaviour, according to 
Ester Žantovská, renders “truth values as unimportant” and what Hare is revealing 
is “the existence of key phrases, their importance for the public digestion of the 
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events […] and their repetition until they have become ‘reality’” (78). The rhythms 
are consistent with reality, even if the content is not.  
 
2. Stuff Happens and the Force of Truth 
The subject matter of Stuff Happens is not the only demonstration of the state 
of the exception. I contend that the play’s construction is in itself an example of the 
state of exception and that David Hare, in his mediation of the real, inhabits his own 
state of exception. Hare attests that his fictional accounts are informed by studious 
research but has provided no evidence to substantiate his play’s narrative. Stuff 
Happens therefore carries the force of truth when in fact the play’s authenticity cannot 
be verified.  
 
Stuff Happens is marketed as a documentary play, wherein recorded dialogue 
is used to “reproduce ‘what really happened’ for presentation in the live space of the 
theatre” (Martin 9). There is a presupposition that what Hare is presenting is 
‘truthful’ (Bottoms 57-58). However, the relationship of Stuff Happens to the record 
and the strength of its claims to truth are precarious. The author’s notes of Stuff 
Happens outline the troubling authenticity of his work:  
The events within it have been authenticated from multiple sources, both 
private and public. What happened happened. Nothing in the narrative is 
knowingly untrue. Scenes of direct address quote people verbatim. When the 
doors closes on the world’s leaders and on their entourages, then I have used 
my imagination. (Hare Stuff Happens, “Author’s Note”) 
In Hare’s author’s note we see the same paradox regarding the state of exception, 
where he allows his claims regarding his work’s authenticity to inhabit an anomic 
zone between fact and fiction, or, as he puts it, “what happened, happened and 
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nothing is unknowingly untrue”. He positions his largely fictional work to be 
interpreted as a documentary, ultimately leading to the unfortunate comparison that 
“like the politicians he satirizes, Hare insists he is shedding light on hidden truths, 
but then fabricates his own evidence (Bottoms 61). Stephen Bottoms estimates that 
“about 80 percent” of the text is imagined (60). 
 
What further complicates the truth claims within Stuff Happens is Hare’s own 
shifting description of his play’s authenticity. To begin with, his own author’s note is 
contradictory and opaque. Jay Gipson-King points out that in Hare’s author’s note, 
Hare claims the play is not a documentary, a position “which contradicts [his] 
insistence upon [the play’s] accuracy” (152). Sara Soncini observes that Hare’s 
reassurance that “what happened, happened” sounds similar to the dismissive 
Donald Rumsfeld quote that inspired the play’s title, while the disclaimer that 
nothing in the narrative is “knowingly untrue […] could have come from the mouth 
of a Blairite spin doctor” (Soncini 101-102). Hare’s reluctance to name his sources, 
provide any verification that they exist, or produce any evidence to bolster his 
claims, further complicates his work’s relationship with the record. The fact that 
there are so many questions regarding the evidence of Hare’s claims is somewhat 
ironic considering Stuff Happens concerns itself not only with manipulation of the 
truth but falsifying of evidence.  
 
Hare subsequently has made differing claims regarding the play’s 
truthfulness, saying in different interviews that the play is “three-fourths” fiction 
(Rawson), that his play is mere “speculation… but my speculations are very well 
sourced, from multiple sources” and that the events of the play “were a theory only” 
(Berson; “David Hare on Stuff Happens”). Gipson-King points out that these 
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differing accounts as to the authenticity of Stuff Happens reveal that Hare is stuck 
between “the impulse of the artist, who wants to take credit for the creative aspects 
of the play, and [...] the pride of the researcher, who wants his findings taken 
seriously” (155). If Gipson-King’s conclusion is correct and Hare desires to claim 
credit for both his research and his art, this still does not excuse Hare’s insistence 
that the play is completely truthful. For instance, when the play opened in the 
United States, Hare claimed that, “if you want to know what happened with Blair, 
and Bush and Powell and company, and you want to get it all in one evening, you 
have to go to the play” (qtd. in Berson). Yet, Hare’s own version of what “really 
happened” also changed when the play transferred from the National Theatre to 
Broadway. Hare altered parts of the play to reflect new evidence that came to light, 
while also making the figure of Colin Powell less sympathetic, having been 
previously criticised by British reviewers for “taking too benign a view of Powell” 
(Bumiller). Hare has defended his play’s truth claims, saying “nobody who was a 
participant in those events has ever questioned my version of them… nobody has 
ever stepped forward and said I’ve got it completely wrong” (qtd. in Hughes 
“Theatre, Performance and the ‘War on Terror” 151). But then why would they? 
Why would any of the players who knew the inner workings of the events depicted 
in Stuff Happens, of whom there are precious few, acknowledge a play that accuses 
them of deception, especially when, due to its construction, the play can so easily be 
dismissed as fiction? As was the case when Conservative MP Ann Widdecombe 
dismissed the play as propaganda, comparing it unfavourably to Leni Riefenstahl's 
Nazi propaganda as art subverted for political reasons (“For or Against”). 
 
3. Stuff Happens and the Real 
Further complicating the truth claims of Stuff Happens is the hybrid nature of 
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the play’s source material. Hare’s rhetoric regarding his script means that it exists on 
three levels of reality: dialogue that is quoted verbatim from speeches, informed 
speculation taken from Hare’s unnamed sources, and imagined dialogue, such as the 
scene depicting a conversation between Blair and Bush as they walk alone around 
Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas (Gipson-King 154). The distinction between these 
levels of reality are not revealed in his work; the audience is unaware what words 
are verbatim and which are invented. Hare’s truth claims, like that of Bush, carry the 
force of truth, but in reality could be hearsay or pure imagination. 
 
The blurring of these three levels of mediation is an uneasy situation, 
particularly because the play is concerned with how political power mediates truth 
and meaning. Stuff Happens creates an uneasy tension where “the story’s ‘actual’ 
linguistic scandals become inextricably confused with Hare’s own rhetorical 
manipulations”(Bottoms 60). Hare cannot claim “he is shedding light on hidden 
truths [...when he] fabricates his own evidence” (Bottoms 61). Gipson-King claims 
that interplay between the different sources allows Hare’s work to exist in 
anomalous void, pointing out that “the charge of inaccuracy cannot be levelled at a 
play that claims to be fiction, while Hare’s insistence on the use of reliable sources 
gives even the imaginative scenes a weight of authority” (155). By juxtaposing the 
meta-references of well-known speeches against invented ones, Hare authenticates 
his imaginings. Daniel Schulze argues that audiences are left with the notion that “I 
knew the speech before, so this one must be also true, I just haven’t heard it” (216). 
Soto-Morettini observes that the verbatim dialogue in Stuff Happens is all lifted from 
public speeches which are “designed to be delivered and received as authoritative” 
and never seems “off the cuff” (Soto-Morettini 314). These speeches are carefully 
constructed by speechwriters and are merely public relations exercises. Therefore, all 
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of the play’s dialogue is constructed and does not provide any greater access to the 
‘real’.  
 
Soncini argues that the use of known characters in Hare’s play also adds extra 
veracity to Hare’s claims and that “the factual public face of the characters confers 
veracity on the private imagined one” (103). This credibility was emphasised in the 
National Theatre’s staging wherein the actors who played the principal parts, Bush, 
Blair, Rice, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Powell, never doubled their roles. The decision to 
have these actors play only one character reinforces the idea that these actors are 
analogous to the ‘real’ individuals they are portraying. The use of these real people 
adds extra credibility to not only the words they are speaking but also to the 
existence of the fictional characters in the play and the opinions they possess.  
 
Hare has five characters who provide “viewpoints”, which are lengthy 
monologues created to allow Hare to provide commentary on events. Soncini argues 
that “it is not clear from the text whether these are real people whose identity is left 
undisclosed, or invented characters in their own right” (103). In the National Theatre 
production Soncini notes that there was no attempt at “differentiating these 
characters based on their ontological status either through style [which] remained in 
the mimetic register throughout” or in the mode of delivery, as “direct address was 
equally used by historical figures and unidentified characters” (103).  
 
 The relationship of Stuff Happens to the real is further complicated by its use 
of verbatim dialogue and appropriation of techniques from documentary theatre, a 
form that is not without its own troubled relationship to the real. Innes argues that 
“the way documentary drama—and, in particular, verbatim theatre—is promoted 
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and understood by its audiences, assumes that the material is factual, is treated 
objectively, and is represented accurately“(442). However, Suzanne Little argues 
that, in fact, documentary theatre exists on a continuum between the highly ethical 
and the highly aesthetic. She posits that this presents an issue for verbatim 
theatremakers, as a highly ethical production can “drain the drama from theatrical 
representation in attempting to perceive a perceived truth” while a highly aesthetical 
production can “exploit and manipulate the source material”. In a discussion of the 
ethical issues in documentary theatre, Bottoms refers to Jacques Derrida’s essay on 
Artaud, “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation”. Derrida 
suggests that traditional text-based theatre is “theological” in that the god-like 
author is “absent and from afar is armed with a text and keeps watch over, 
assembles, regulates the tie or the meaning of presentation” while perpetuating the 
illusion that he “creates nothing [...] because he only transcribes and makes available 
for reading a text [that] maintains with what is called the ‘real’ [...] an imitative and 
reproductive relationship (qtd. in Bottoms 59). Taking this theory of theological 
presence, Bottoms applies it to documentary theatre which he claims is “double 
illusory”, as it presents to its audience “speech of ‘actual people’ involved in ‘real 
events’”; however, labelling the work verbatim “obscures the world-shaping role of 
the writer in the editing and juxtaposing [of] the gathered materials” (59). Innes goes 
further, stating that the work created in documentary theatre “without exception, 
[...] is propagandistic: factual form serves an embedded message” (442). Soto-
Morettini suggests that documentary theatre “explicitly points to itself as an act of 
literariness but it simultaneously positions itself [...] as non-literary with an Oz-like 
desire to hide the man behind the curtain” (314).  
 
Hare’s previous documentary work, is not without its detractors. Brian 
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Logan, writing for The Times, accused Hare of “opportunism”, insofar that Hare 
“hijacked the bandwagon” of verbatim theatre to further Hare’s own interests, at the 
“expense of verbatim theatre’s hard-won authority” (14). In a short essay, that is 
included as commentary with the published script of Robin Soans’ Talking to 
Terrorists, Hare celebrates documentary theatre as offering  
authentic news of overlooked thought and feeling [...] What a welcome 
corrective to the cosy art-for-art’s sake racket which theatre all too easily 
becomes! [...] Theatre using real people has become a fabulously rich and 
varied strand which, for many years, has been pumping red cells into the 
dramatic bloodstream. (Talking to Terrorists 112-113)  
 
Despite the issues surrounding Stuff Happens, Hare also has a history of 
foregrounding his work’s constructedness. His play Fanshen (1975), described by 
Innes as prefiguring “the post-millennial documentary genre”, draws attention to 
how the story is being mediated from its source material (437). Fanshen is based on 
William H. Hinton’s book Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village 
(1966), chronicling how a remote Chinese village adapts to Communist reforms. At 
the start of the play Yu-Lai, an ex-bandit, holds up a book and announces, “this is the 
book Fanshen by William Hinton” (Hare, Fanshen 6). Hare also indicates the actor 
should read out the publisher of the book he is holding and the current sale price. 
This is promptly followed by another character reminding the audience that this is a 
story and that these characters are still alive. In Hare’s Absence of War trilogy,3 which 
examines contemporary crises within three British institutions - the church, the 
judicial system and the Labour Party - he actively distinguishes his work from the 






interviewed by Hare, these characters have “imaginary names and slight disguises 
[...] and the action is fabricated” (Innes 441). Of even more importance is that Hare 
published in a companion handbook, Asking Around, the interviews that inspired the 
trilogy.  
 
However, Hare’s more explicit documentary work reveals a problematic 
relationship with ‘the real’. Innes, for example, identifies ethical issues with Hare’s 
one-man show on the Israel/Palestine conflict Via Dolorosa (441). Based on his fact-
finding tour in Israel and Palestine, the play is performed by Hare who plays himself 
which, according to Innes, lends “the piece an authenticity” which distracts from the 
fact that the play is “subjective to an extreme that is the antithesis of documentary 
drama” (Innes 441). By making himself interviewer and subject, Hare’s theological 
presence, as Derrida puts it, is overwhelming. However, unlike Stuff Happens, with 
Via Dolorosa “we are never in any doubt about the impressionistic, rather than the 
strictly ‘historical’ nature of Hare’s very personal monologue “ (Soto-Morettini 314).  
 
Bottoms critiques Stuff Happens for its lack of self-evident signifiers that reveal 
the play’s mediation. Comparing the play to Moisés Kaufman’s Gross Indecency: The 
Three Trials of Oscar Wilde, he argues that documentary plays must “acknowledge 
their dual identity and thus ambiguous status as both “document” and “play”; 
without doing so documentary theatre is in danger of becoming “a disingenuous 
exercise in the presentation of “truth”, failing (or refusing) to acknowledge [its] own 
highly selective manipulation of opinion and rhetoric” (57-58). For Stuff Happens to 
satisfy Bottom’s demand that documentary theatre acknowledge its dual identity, 
Hare needs to show the three levels of mediation present in his work and I contend 




The scenes behind closed doors are invented by Hare, but, according to his 
author’s note, we are assured that they carry a level of credibility and create an 
illusion that Hare has acquired “a certain aura of privileged information” (Bottoms, 
25). However, the behind closed door scenes contain both versimiliar discussions of 
Powell’s opposition to the war and at the same time borderline cartoonish scenes, 
such as George and Laura Bush putting together a jigsaw as the president’s cabinet 
proudly look on. This creates a situation where “it is impossible to tell with any 
reliability where factual reportage stops and political caricature starts: under Hare’s 
all-seeing gaze, both acquire equal status as (dramatic) truth” (Bottoms 60).  
 
When asked by Will Hammond and Dan Steward whether he “makes any 
distinction” between real and imagined dialogue, Hare claimed that his mediation is 
self-evident, paraphrasing his own author’s note that scenes of direct address quote 
people verbatim, while behind closed doors, the events are completely imagined 
(63). However, in performance, this distinction is obscured. As Soncini argues, this 
distinction is “limited entirely to the paratext [the script]”, so in performance “the 
boundaries between the actually spoken and the ‘not quite spoken’ tend to become 
blurred (102). What constitutes “behind closed doors” is unclear in the 
performance’s staging, which in the case of the National Theatre’s production, 
constitutes a bare stage with minimal set and props, making it difficult to ascertain 
when the actors are in public and when they are in private. But even in the paratext 
it is unclear exactly what constitutes ‘direct address’. There are many moments when 
the characters speak to the audience or break the fourth wall which are almost 
certainly imagined. For instance, after a meeting between Bush and Powell, in which 
Bush tells Powell he is proceeding with an invasion of Iraq without approval from 
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the United Nations: 
AN ACTOR Later, Bush recalls: 
BUSH It was a very cordial conversation. I would describe it as 
cordial. I think the log will show that it was relatively short. 
AN ACTOR White House records show that the encounter lasted twelve 
minutes 
Bush, alone, looks at us a moment. 
BUSH I didn’t need permission (Stuff Happens 92). 
 
Instead of actively revealing his work’s fictionality, Hare utilises techniques 
that enforce Stuff Happens’ perceived authenticity while veiling Hare’s mediation. 
Hare employs a technique that Innes describes as ‘constant commentary’ where, in 
Brechtian fashion, actors step out of role, to give context to proceedings, often 
quoting names, titles and exact dates. The act of having actors, out of role, 
commentating on these events creates the sense that these are true events being 
replayed in performance, emphasising the desired ‘documentary feel’ of the material 
and enforcing the perceived authenticity of the play.  
For example at the start of the play:  
Another actor steps forward: 
AN ACTOR  Stuff. Happens. The response of Donald Rumsfeld, the 
American Secretary of Defence, when asked to comment on 
the widespread looting and pillage that followed the 
American conquest of Baghdad – Friday, April 11th 2003. (Stuff 
Happens, 3) 
Hare’s Rumsfeld appears and proceeds to deliver his ‘stuff happens’ speech, a 
speech that is well known to the public and can also be found in the public record. 
	
56 
This use of narration could serve to mark what is fact over what is fiction in the play; 
however, Hare uses this device throughout his play, regardless of the source 
material. For instance, at the beginning of scene four, Bush’s cabinet discuss 
invading Iraq for the first time, a scene surely invented by Hare.  
Bush, fastidiously punctual, is already in place, sitting alone at the head of a torpedo-
shaped table.  
AN ACTOR The new administration hits the ground running. Ten days 
after his inauguration, on January 30th 2001, President Bush 
presides at a meeting of the National Security Council for the 
first time. 
[...] 
BUSH Now let’s move on. Iraq 
O’NEIL Iraq? 
AN ACTOR  Paul O’Neill. Secretary of the Treasury. 
O’NEIL  Iraq?  
 (Stuff Happens, 10-12) 
In both instances, ‘The Actor’, uses precise dates and titles, the use of which, Bottoms 
argues, “lends a spurious aura of “verbatim” authority to the characters’ subsequent 
words - words that Hare has presumably invented” (60).  
 
While it could be argued that verbatim theatre achieves a new form of 
political efficacy, as described in Hare’s essay Talking To Terrorists, this does not hide 
that “his masculinist rhetoric casually obscures the fact that realism and reality are 
not the same thing, and that unmediated access to “the real” is not something the 
theatre can ever honestly provide” (Bottoms 57). It is quite clear that Hare’s role as 





4. Hare’s Audience as Homo Sacer 
The various levels of reality that exist in Hare’s work coupled with the lack of 
mediation in Stuff Happens, therefore creates an environment in which Hare’s 
audience could be wilfully misled. Some commentators have argued, which will be 
discussed below, that Hare’s interplay of these levels of reality asks his audience to 
“be wary of reifying material evidence as an indisputable carrier of truth” (Soncini 
103). However, I contend that Hare’s audience is unaware of what evidence is real 
and what is imagined. Agamben argues that in a state of exception there are “two 
poles of the sovereign exception” (Homo Sacer 110). If Hare is Agamben’s exceptional 
sovereign then the other pole of exceptionalism, the homo sacer, is the audience. 
Hare’s audiences are not equipped with an author’s note, nor is the play’s interplay 
of fact and fiction revealed and therefore, the audience must take Hare’s truth claims 
at face value. Arguably, without Hare revealing how his work is mediated, his 
audience may interpret the entire play as entirely truthful.  
 
Some scholars have argued that the three levels of reality in Hare’s work, 
coupled with his seemingly disingenuous claims over the veracity of his research, 
point towards an artist who is asking his audience to think more critically about how 
truth and knowledge are disseminated. Colleran, for instance, declares that “the 
engine [of Stuff Happens] is its collage of the imagined and the seen; the tension 
between these invites the viewer to think critically about surface and depth” (140). 
Soncini suggests that the blurring of these boundaries in Hare’s play, “allows for a 
more complex, nuanced configuration of representational modes to emerge” (103). 
What Hare presents is not merely truth and fiction living in a “hybrid cohabitation” 
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but reveals how these two domains can be reversed (Soncini 103). The verbatim 
authenticates the fiction, but on the other hand Hare’s fictional imaginings are 
“granted a higher degree of truthfulness than… the public evidence quoted in the 
play [which] is certainly authentic but it is designed to obscure, rather than disclose 
the truth about Iraq” (Soncini 103). The verbatim dialogue is banal statements 
designed to conceal and manipulate, while Hare’s imagined dialogue is “recast as 
‘counterfeit’ dramatic dialogue”.  
 
However, for audiences to engage critically in this manner, they must be 
aware that they are being deceived by Hare, which, based on the reactions of the 
informed reviewers who attended his play, they are not. Instead of being more 
critically attuned to the multiple sources of contradictory information regarding the 
Iraq war, the play reinforces the information provided by its author as the definitive 
version of events. Hare does not create an engaged public sphere at the National 
Theatre and instead, as theatre historian David Wiles argues, creates the “instant and 
illusory thrill of an engaged citizenship, while not actually identifying the 
fundamental issues upon which a social consensus must rest prior to effective 
political action” (212). Stuff Happens, like the politicians it skewers, is ultimately 
attempting to enforce its own singular narrative onto a complicated, politicised 
series of events. The failure to foreground the level to which Hare is mediating and 
inventing events, seems unethical and disingenuous. This form of reflexive verbatim, 
which asks its audience to think critically about the dissemination of truth, through 
its mixture of fact and fiction does exist and has been achieved successfully. Stuart 
Young discusses this form of documentary theatre in his article “Playing with 
Documentary” highlighting Pol Heyvaert and Dimitri Verhulst’s Aalst [2005] and 
Dennis Kelly’s Taking Care of Baby [2007] as key examples of work that emphasises 
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“the process of writing or reporting, thereby drawing attention to the methods of 
construction in documentary theatre and to the problematic issues inherent in those 
methods” (75). However, as Young points out, both plays are self-referential; they 
constantly point to their own mediation to make the audience question the play’s 
authenticity. There are no similar devices found in Stuff Happens. 
 
Without this level of self-reflexivity, many of the reviewers celebrated Stuff 
Happens for presenting what they assumed was the “truth”. John Nathan of the 
Jewish Chronicle claims that “Hare does not distort the facts in order to make a point - 
rather he sticks to them”, while Innes argued that Stuff Happens is “dealing in a hard-
nosed, factual way with very recent history and the events of the day, establishing 
new standards of authenticity” (448). In fact, Gipson-King indicates that “over two-
thirds [of reviewers] considered the play, balanced, accurate, and convincing”(153). 
Gipson-King also notes that those reviewers who acknowledged the play’s fictional 
foundations still casually referred to the events of the play as the truth due to its 
illusory connection to the real, arguing that Stuff Happens “is exactly the kind of 
enduring work that builds a myth over time”, and concluding that “what actually 
happened in the past matters far less than what people believe to have happened” 
(165). For instance, The Times reviewer Benedict Nightingale wrote that Stuff Happens 
left him “wondering [...] about the accuracy and therefore the authority of a play 
whose author admits he’s “used my imagination” to fill in the bits not on public 
record. And yet, again and again, I felt that yes, this is how it was” (23).  
 
Hare’s own reputation further added to the perceived ‘truthfulness’ of the 
play. Gipson-King pointed out that “Hare had long held a reputation as an 
outspoken leftist [...while] his feelings about the Iraq war [were not] in any way 
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neutral”4 and this “partisan reputation actually worked in his favour to increase the 
overall perception of the play as fair and balanced” (153, 155). Kate Bassett, in her 
review for The Independent on Sunday, was taken aback by the play’s initial pro-war 
bias stating “in the early scenes you start wondering if Hare, the famous Hampstead 
left-winger, has decided it’s time for a swing to the right”. Billington, in his review in 
the Guardian, suggested that, Hare “cannily subverts” his own anti-war bias; “you 
see this most powerfully in a speech, credited to a journalist, that questions our 
tendency to view Iraq from a local political viewpoint” and writes one of the greatest 
defences of the war (“Review: Stuff Happens”). He is referring to the monologue by 
‘An Angry British Journalist’, one of Hare’s invented viewpoints, which argues, 
How spoiled, how indulged we are to discuss the manner – oh yes, we 
discuss the manner, late into the night, candles guttering, our faces sweating, 
reddening with wine and hatred – but the act itself – the thing done – the 
splendid thing done – freedom given to people who were not free – this thing 
is ignored, preferring as we do to fight amongst ourselves – our own disputes, 
our own resentment of each other elevated way above the needs of the 
victims (Hare, Stuff Happens 15). 
Gipson King argues that Hare avoids caricature and “gives real teeth to Bush and his 
cabinet members” pointing out that Alex Jennings’ portrayal of the president 
“sharply contrasted” with the caricatured depictions London audiences were used to 
in plays such as The Madness of George Dubya or in parodies such as those of Will 
Ferrell on Saturday Night Live which depicted the President as an incompetent fool 










While the play does contain some anti-war sentiments, these are argued less often 
and less fervently than the pro-war portions. In fact, the pro-war themes are found 
exclusively in Hare’s viewpoints, small vignettes separate to the play’s main 
storyline, while the primary thrust of the play is concerned with the depiction of the 
Bush cabinet as manipulative war-mongers. Gipson-King identifies that there is a 
dangerous contradiction in the response from a reviewer who accuses the play of 
being balanced while also celebrating the play’s “clear anti-war message” (156).  
 
5. Hare’s Anomic Role 
Stuff Happens therefore exists in an anomic space wherein it simultaneously 
carries the force of truth while being false. This anomic space exists because Hare’s 
own role in relation to the play is unclear. Like the Agamben sovereign who exists 
between the executive and the judicial branches of government, this lack of 
definition in Hare’s role means that he also exists in an anomic space, picking the 
forms and functions he desires for his play at will. Discussed earlier were Hare’s 
attempts to reconcile the roles of the artist and the playwright and how that led to 
the uncomfortable co-existence of truth and fiction. However, further complicating 
the play is Hare’s attempt to take on the role of the journalist and the historian.  
 
Agamben identifies that a sovereign's exceptional behaviour is often 
‘legitimised‘ by distinguishing an ‘external force’ which represents a threat to 
citizens in the sovereign’s care. One could easily make the argument that, in this 
vein, Hare is simply responding to the actions of the Bush and Blair governments 
and taking extraordinary measures regarding his play’s truth claims to inform an ‘at 
risk’ public. He is taking over the role of what he sees as ineffectual investigative 
journalism. Hare explains in a 2008 interview: 
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Journalism is failing us…and is in some sort of ethical crisis about how they 
came to be so complicit with the regime – ‘what was the blackmail following 
9/11 that made us incapable of doing reporting?’ Now the theatre rushes to 
fill that void because journalism isn’t doing the job (Hammond and Steward 
62).  
Hare’s description that contemporary media is “a rich mix of what people never 
meant combined artfully with what people never said”, could also be applied to the 
construction of his play (62). Hare’s assessment of contemporary journalism was 
shared by prominent newspapers like the New York Times which released apologies 
that its “reporting had not been as rigorous as it could have been” and its editorial 
standards which “should have been challenging reporters and pressing for more 
skepticism were perhaps too intent on rushing scoops into the paper” (“From the 
Editors”). Hare argues that journalism is failing because “it’s not adequately 
representing or interpreting” the complicated geopolitical events of the modern era, 
but fails to identify how theatre represents or interprets this more ‘adequately’ (62). 
Hare’s use of vague language in assuming these responsibilities is very much in line 
with the state of exception.  
 
Hare wants his work to be seen as something that provides a definitive 
version of events by imposing “a kind of coherency and order” on what, for the 
audiences of the time, would have still been a “mixture of heavily controlled media 
images, unallocated weapons of mass destruction, ideological tales of moral warfare 
and the outer reaches of weblog hysteria” (Soto-Morettini 309). This kind of 
structuring changes Hare’s role from strictly that of a playwright, to one of 
reportage. However, as Soto-Morettini argues, Hare is not supplying us “eyewitness 
accounts” of events, so he is not a journalist; nor does he seem “to be carrying out 
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the larger, contextualizing task of the historian” (312). She further argues that Hare 
had not “achieved any kind of chronological distance from [his] subject [nor] even to 
be able to finish the story that they began telling” (312). If Hare’s role is to give us an 
accurate understanding of the invasion of Iraq, he fails to give greater context to 
events. Despite some references to the characters in the introduction, Hare’s play 
begins in 2001. But by starting his “history” here, Soto-Morettini points out that he 
ignores not only the first Gulf War but also the call for action against Iraq in 1998 by 
the Neo-Conservative think-tank Project for a New American Century (PNAC), 
signed by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (312). Hare does not give a greater 
understanding “to the intractable political drive behind the Bush administration’s 
determination to launch military action against Iraq [... the] failure to do so means 
that in viewing/reading either account the (highly questionable causal) link between 
the attack on September 11 and the war in Iraq go largely unquestioned” (313). 
Hare’s supposed ‘balanced’ representation of Bush’s cabinet simply characterises 
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice et al as having no clear reason for their actions and simply 
being eager warmongers.  
 
Hare’s superficial historical account of Iraq is exemplified in the final 
monologue of the play. While the entirety of Stuff Happens consists of predominantly 
white men discussing the future of a country in the Middle East, Hare decides to 
give the final word to an “Iraqi exile”. However, this monologue borders on cultural 
imperialism:  
IRAQI EXILE: [...] I mean, if there is a word, Iraq has been crucified. By 
Saddam’s sins, by ten years of sanctions, and then this. 
Basically it’s a story of a nation that failed in only one thing. 
But it’s a big sin. It failed to take care of itself. And that means 
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the worst person in the country took charge. Until this nation 
takes charge of itself, it will continue to suffer. 
I mean, Iraqis say to me, “Look, tell America.” I tell them: 
“You are putting your faith in the wrong person. Don’t expect 
America or anybody will do it for you. If you don’t do it 
yourself this is what you get” (120).  
Firstly, it is important to recognise this monologue is completely invented by 
Hare - there is no evidence that this view is shared by any Iraqis. Hare is speaking on 
behalf of an entire nation that has been traumatised by the West, while he 
simultaneously reduces these experiences to a short monologue at the end of the 
play. Secondly, the monologue contradicts the play's central idea that history is 
created by political forces hidden from view. In the monologue, Hare seems to be 
arguing that Iraq is somewhat responsible for the state in which it finds itself. While 
the monologue accuses the West of ignoring the needs of Iraqi citizens, it neglects to 
mention how similar external forces have shaped the nation’s history of instability.  
 
Soto-Morettini points out that Hare’s own research “must have led him to 
understand that such a relatively young nation (independent only since 1932), sitting 
on the world’s largest unexplored oil fields would be a tantalising fat minnow in the 
pool of global oil sharks” (313). She points out that foreign intervention by 
petroleum conglomerates and various oppressive governments propped up by the 
US, being “seduced and abandoned” by the CIA, had created such political 
instability in Iraq that it is hard to see a traumatised Iraqi citizen “having any chance 
to ‘take control’ of their country” and to conclude as such is “deeply worrisome” 
(313). Ryan Claycomb agrees, stating that Hare’s conclusion “might well have come 
from the diary of a Victorian imperial administrator” or from “the political machine 
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[Hare] seeks to condemn”(96). Ironically, had the monologue ended by revealing 
Iraq to be the victim of unseen political machinations, the point Hare was trying to 
make, it would have provided a stronger end to the play, revealing that history is 
out of the hands of the common man and in the hands of the politicians who dare to 
take more than they are allowed. Hare’s historical account is also troubled by how 
he reduces the story to good and evil actors. Hughes argues that the play is simply 
reduced to a “historical tragedy complete with fatally flawed tragic hero”, mourning 
“the failure of goodness” while simultaneously “affirming the British government’s 
liberal values” and painting the Americans as the villains of the piece. Painting the 
British government and Blair in this light does “not extend to questioning Blair’s 
good intentions critically” (Performance in a Time of Terror 115). 
 
If Hare desires that his work clarifies the timeline leading to war in Iraq, there 
are many ethical issues with the way in which he depicts and constructs his history. 
Soto-Morettini by appealing to Hayden White’s Metahistory argues that Hare 
presents a romanticised version of history, reducing complicated events into “a 
formal coherency to which we ourselves aspire” (319). Hare gives us narrative 
closure on an event that was “far from being finished” (319). Hare maintains that his 
play is a history play, but at the same time makes no concessions to the behemothic 
task that is at hand, suggesting that his “drama unfolds unproblematically alongside 
the given world it represents but also assumes a kind of ontological authority 
(through both the historical facts of its characters’ existence and the simultaneous 
fact of the actors’ presence before an audience) that weights meaning in the 
representation (314). When considering the narrative of Stuff Happens in relation to 
the multitude of possible reasons and historical circumstances that led to the conflict, 
we are merely reminded, “of how difficult it is to encompass the massive 
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overdetermination of a complex moment in history without continually ‘writing in 
the margins’ or groping for a summary in the face of the ‘un-sum up-able’” (Soto-
Morettini 318). Many of Hare’s claims have been validated with time. The findings of 
the Chilcot Report point to Hare’s assertions regarding the manufacturing of 
evidence. Hare notes that “the claims the play makes were controversial at the time 
[...] It has now become standard history” (Foster). I contend this only betrays Hare’s 
belief that his play should be seen as a historical document despite the play’s 
fictionality. While some of his claims have now been verified it is hard to see this as a 
defence for the slippery nature of fact in his play; for instance would we have 
legitimised the invasion of Iraq knowing that the Bush and Blair governments were 
aware of the lack of weapons of mass destruction had they found a couple of vials of 
sarin gas by mistake? As he has still not provided any of the evidence for his claims, 
it is hard to see if this legitimises his work’s research or is simply educated 
guesswork. The truth claims in Stuff Happens, legitimised with the passage of time, 
do not make his entire work truthful, just like using some verbatim dialogue does 
not make his entire work verbatim.  
 
As an artist Hare arguably can write whatever he likes; as an artist he should 
be allowed to respond to contemporary life uninhibited. He himself describes the 
role of the artist as responsive: “You find the driftwood on the beach, but you carve 
the wood and paint it to make it art” (Struggle, Obedience & Revolt 12). However, 
when he positions his work as being representative of actual events and to be a 
version of the truth, Hare starts to enter the anomalous void of the state of exception. 
Hare utilises devices to promote his work as truthful, operating somewhere between 
documentary theatre maker, journalist, historian and artist. He uses his work and its 
truth claims to implement a problematic narrative that furthers his own interests. 
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Without foregrounding his “own processes of representation in order to 
acknowledge the problem and encourage audiences to adopt an actively critical 
perspective on the events depicted”, Hare grants himself special power and 
dissemination of the truth, making him guilty of the same crimes as those he wishes 






IMPOSITIONS OF TRUTH  
RICHARD NORTON-TAYLOR AND JUSTIFYING WAR (2003) 
 
 
Justifying War (2003) by Richard Norton-Taylor is an example of a particular 
form of documentary theatre, the tribunal play. These plays, closely associated with 
London’s Tricycle Theatre, seek to “create as close a mimetic reproduction of a 
public judicial inquiry as possible” through the use of documentary theatre 
techniques and courtroom transcripts as source material (Finburgh 209). Tribunals 
selected for “forensic reenactment” are those that investigate “miscarriages of justice 
or malpractice within the British legal, judicial and political institutions” (Megson 
110). Tribunal plays focus on formal tribunals of inquiry called by government 
institutions to investigate actions or events carried out on behalf of the government. 
Justifying War is a recreation of the Hutton Inquiry which was called by then British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair to investigate the death of British weapons expert Dr 
David Kelly. There was much public interest in this case as Dr Kelly had contributed 
to the controversial ‘September Dossier’, a report which the British and American 
governments used as evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. 
Norton-Taylor believes that tribunal plays embody “how powerful and how 
complementary to journalism - in many ways how much more effective than 
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journalism - the theatre can be” insofar as it concisely allows audiences to “listen 
together and inwardly - indeed outwardly - digest and understand properly what all 
the fuss was about” (qtd. in Hammond & Steward 105; 122). Chris Megson reaffirms 
Norton-Taylor’s claim that these plays are for the public good as they 
enable their audience to undertake a collective act of bearing witness […] In 
this sense, we might conceive of these tribunal simulacra as acts of reclamation 
- an opening up of institutional processes normally hidden from view or 
submerged within a deluge of newsprint. (123)  
Thus one of the aims of Justifying War is to achieve the same aim as the tribunal it 
restages; that is, the forensic recreation of the events leading up to Dr Kelly’s death 
and, in so doing, bring to light the definitive version of events.  
 
This chapter will initially contextualise the events surrounding Justifying War 
and briefly discuss the form and function of tribunal theatre, before analysing the 
editorial process of the play’s author, Richard Norton-Taylor; in particular, how he 
attempts to reduce or preface his authorial role with the text. Unlike Hare, Norton-
Taylor adheres to a rigid editorial process, which he endeavours to make apparent to 
his audience. It is my assertion that, although this diminishes his own exceptional 
relationship to the truth, it nevertheless allows his audience to critically engage with 
his work.  
 
I argue that Norton-Taylor’s strict editorial process creates epistemological 
limitations in his work. His play is restricted in what it can reveal about the true 
state of affairs, as his work is dependent on the text available to him, which is limited 
to the content of the testimony delivered at the tribunal he strives to recreate. It is my 
argument that within a state of exception, a public tribunal is restricted in bringing 
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the truth to light by the very government that it is investigating. Tribunals become 
spaces wherein the exception is performed, endorsing the sovereign’s exceptional 
behaviour and their singular imposition of justice, which presents epistemological 
limitations regarding what tribunal theatre can illuminate. Through references to 
Agamben's earlier work Homo Sacer and legal scholar Nicole Roger’s work which 
references tribunals operating at Guantanamo Bay, I argue that institutional legal 
systems can authorise, and are an extension of, exceptional behaviour rather than 
systems that restrict sovereign power.  
 
I further argue that Richard Norton-Taylor and the Tricycle Theatre are aware 
of the tribunal theatre’s limitations in terms of establishing the ‘true’ version of 
events. Instead, Norton-Taylor uses Justifying War to bring to light these judicial 
failings and the wider democratic crisis stemming from the exceptional behaviour of 
politicians and institutional modes of establishing truth. While not illuminating the 
events that lead to Dr Kelly’s death, Justifying War reminds us that that impositions 
of truth and the enacting of justice can be a ‘performative’ act and that audiences 
should be wary of people and institutions that promote singular impositions of the 
truth. Furthermore, Justifying War demonstrates how certain individuals’ voices, in 
this case those of Dr Kelly and his wife, are treated as Agamben’s homo sacer or 
person who is outside the law.  
 
1. The Death of Dr Kelly 
Dr David Kelly was a reputed and experienced expert in chemical and 
biological weaponry. He had previously worked in Iraq as a UN weapons expert at 
the end of the First Gulf War, and at the time of his death was the British 
government's chief advisor on biological warfare. Dr Kelly was consulted in the 
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drafting of a report, latterly referred to as the September Dossier (as it was released 
to the public on 24th September 2002), which contained evidence supporting the 
claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. This dossier was a 
significant part of the British Government’s case for an invasion of Iraq. Dr Kelly had 
reservations regarding the quality of the evidence contained within the dossier, 
believing many of its allegations overstated the available intelligence. One of the 
dossier’s most egregious claims, that would later saturate the front pages of the 
British tabloids, was found in the foreword, authored by Tony Blair, asserting that 
Saddam Hussein’s “military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready 
within 45 minutes of an order to use them” (“Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction” 
4).  
 
After the invasion, Dr Kelly voiced his reservations in an off-the-record 
interview with Andrew Gilligan, a BBC journalist, who subsequently ran a story, on 
May 29th 2003, claiming that the government “probably knew that the forty-five 
minute figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in” (Hutton). In ensuing 
reports, Gilligan claimed the evidence was ‘sexed-up’ and named key government 
officials who had knowingly embellished the dossier, chiefly the government's 
Director of Communications, Alastair Campbell. To further bolster his allegations, 
Gilligan identified his source as a government official involved in the preparation of 
the September Dossier. The British government responded by saying Gilligan’s 
allegations were false and demanded a retraction from the BBC, while the British 
press demanded to know the source of this leak.  
 
By July 15th 2003, it had become public knowledge that Dr Kelly was 
Gilligan’s unnamed government source and he was called to appear before a 
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Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. It was later revealed that the Ministry of 
Defence had leaked details regarding Dr Kelly’s identity to the press, up to a point 
where they would not reveal his name but would confirm it to anyone who guessed 
correctly. Two days after appearing before the parliamentary committee, Dr Kelly, 
while walking alone in the woods near his home, committed suicide by slitting his 
wrists and consuming the painkillers that were prescribed for his wife’s arthritis. It 
was understood that Dr Kelly was an extremely private man and he had not coped 
with the increased public scrutiny into his life or the questioning of his expertise by 
the parliamentary committee. Subsequently, Tony Blair called for a special judicial 
inquiry, known as the Hutton Inquiry, to investigate the circumstances and chain of 
events that lead to Dr Kelly’s death. The Inquiry opened on August 1st 2003 and 
presented its findings on 28th January 2004. It completely exonerated the 
government of blame regarding Dr Kelly’s death, and largely blamed the BBC for the 
events that followed Gilligan’s report. The report made no mention of the legality of 
the Invasion of Iraq.  
 
The events of Dr Kelly’s death were surrounded by an epistemological 
indeterminacy regarding the legality of invasion of Iraq. The Hutton Inquiry was 
granted the remit to investigate only the death of Dr Kelly and was unable to 
investigate the legality of the Iraq war, despite the questions about the legality of the 
invasion and the wilful misleading of the British public being a constant spectre 
during the tribunal. The Hutton Inquiry’s findings were subsequently  
widely regarded as a whitewash, [...] no wrongdoing was found on the part of 
the government in putting together the dossier [of misinformation] or ‘outing’ 
Kelly […] and that Kelly was responsible for breaking an official code of 
silence. (Gupta 108).  
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There was such scepticism regarding the death of Dr Kelly a fifth of the British 
public believed Dr David Kelly had not committed suicide and was in fact part of a 
wider government conspiracy, a theory rejected by Richard Norton-Taylor as lacking 
supporting evidence (“Alone in the Woods”)5.  
 
2. Tribunal Theatres and the Tricycle  
The Tricycle Theatre became the ostensible leader in producing tribunal 
theatre under the leadership of artistic director Nicholas Kent and a partnership 
Kent formed with The Guardian journalist, Richard Norton-Taylor. The purpose of 
both tribunal plays and the tribunals they recreate is to establish a definitive version 
of questionable events involving government institutions. Both tribunals and 
tribunal theatre exist to bring ‘truth’ to the public. Director Max Stafford-Clark 
argues that the witnessing of a tribunal play is important for spectators in their 
“search for the truth and the exposure of injustice” (qtd. in Hammond and Steward 
124). This truth should then provoke discussion and enlightenment regarding the 
democratic process and how government functions. To encompass this theory the 
Tricycle Theatre decided to stage Justifying War immediately after the tribunal had 
wrapped up proceedings, but before Lord Hutton presented his findings. This broke 
with tradition as the Tricycle plays usually include the tribunal findings in their 
performances. Norton-Taylor explained that Nicholas Kent convinced him to stage 
the play early to sharpen the public appetite in preparation for the tribunal’s 




5 A 2007 BBC poll indicated 22.7% of people surveyed believed Dr Stephen Kelly had not killed 
himself, while a further 38.5% were unsure (“Doubts Over Kelly Death says Poll”). For more on the 
doubts surrounding Kelly’s death see: Baker 2007, Dyer 2011. 
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Some of the more notable British inquiries include the Saville Inquiry, which 
investigated the events of Bloody Sunday, and the Chilcot Inquiry, which was called 
“to identify the lessons that can be learned” from the run up to Iraq (The Iraq Inquiry) 
and ran for over seven years. While these inquiries are typically open to the public, 
there are often only a few seats available. Before the turn of the millenia, inquiries in 
Britain were broadcast on public television, but there has been a subsequent trend 
for these events to go untelevised. Tribunal theatre then exists to bring these 
inquiries before the public in a more thorough way and with a higher level of 
verisimilitude than can be communicated through the limitations of print media.  
 
Under the tenure of artistic director Nicholas Kent, the Tricycle Theatre has restaged 
inquiries investigating issues as diverse as institutional racism (The Colour of Justice 
(1999)), historical war crimes (Nuremberg and Srebrenica (both 1996)) and “The 
Troubles” (Bloody Sunday (2005)). An overwhelming number of the Tricycle’s 
tribunal plays have been based on inquiries into invasions and occupations of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, including Justifying War (2004), and Tactical Questioning: The Baha 
Mousa Inquiry (2011) all by Richard Norton-Taylor, Guantanamo: Honor Bound to 
Defend Freedom by Victoria Brittain and Gillian Slovo, and Chilcot by Daisy Bowie-
Sell (2016).  
 
The Tricycle Theatre’s first foray into tribunal theatre occurred when Kent 
commissioned Richard Norton-Taylor, the Security Affairs editor for The Guardian, to 
edit a concise version of the testimony from the 1992 Scott Inquiry into the sale of 
arms to Iraq in the 1980s, which Norton-Taylor had been covering. This would 
become Norton-Taylor’s first play, Half The Picture (1994), which he later described 
as not being “promising material for a stage show. The story had no physical action, 
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no surprises, very little movement, and not much of a plot” (qtd. in Hammond and 
Steward 105). While lacking in dramatic action, Norton-Taylor discovered that the 
play instead was rife with drama regarding the actions and behaviours of the central 
characters; “it had dissembling, buck-passing, hiding behind euphemisms, word 
play, facetious use of aphorisms and, above all, the cynicism and amorality of 
arrogant and unaccountable officials” (106). Norton-Taylor’s discoveries provided 
the agenda for the Tricycle’s tribunal plays: the truth, “the search for it and the 
denial of it [being] constant themes” (108). This work has been motivated by a “sense 
of obligation” to, according to Nicholas Kent, shine a light on injustice or history that 
has been obscured (135).  
 
Norton-Taylor claims that a primary function of tribunal plays is to assist traditional 
journalism in enlightening the wider public by “capturing a different kind of 
audience, or a similar audience in a different way” (“Courtroom Drama”). There is 
limited public access to these tribunals, and traditional journalism was seen as 
ineffectual in communicating the breadth of information, due to the sheer volume of 
testimony, evidence and the ever-changing landscapes of tribunals that can last 
months or even years. Norton-Taylor argues that “The perforce brutal and 
inconsistent editing, the constant fight for space or airtime, is one of the many 
problems of journalism as a medium” (qtd. in Hammond & Steward 122). For 
Soncini the drawn out nature of tribunals is often lost on audiences, and tribunal 
theatre’s ability to condense these narratives is one of its strengths. Appealing to 
Aristotle’s Poetics, Soncini argues that audiences 
will only grasp the organic unity of a story, and therefore its sense, if they can 
easily embrace its narrative arc in a single view; the material presented in 
dramatic form must be quantitatively compatible with the scope of their gaze 
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and their memory capacity [...] the tribunal playwright is [...] aimed at bringing 
observability into a confusing plethora of source material in order to make it 
intelligible to the spectator. (86) 
In short, the Tricycle’s tribunal plays serve a civic duty, described by Soncini as 
“theatrical interventions into the public sphere”; the plays are designed to inform the 
public, to bring to the fore obscured truths and correct a perceived democratic deficit 
(82).  
 
To achieve the “unity of story” described by Soncini, Norton Taylor’s role as 
editor is to refine the available testimony, which can cover months or years, into a 
three hour play that illuminates the wider story. He describes his work as “the 
methodical process of cutting through these layers of duplicity until an accurate, not 
always orderly account emerged”, something Michael Billington describes as “raw 
information” (qtd. in Hammond and Steward 106; State of the Nation 384-385). 
Norton-Taylor admits that his plays “are not comprehensive, but they are 
representative”, equating the veracity of the truth claims of Justifying War to those 
within traditional journalism (qtd. in Hammond and Steward 129, 131). While 
tribunal theatre and journalism have different styles of presentation, both are subject 
to editing by their authors and therefore are open to the same level of bias. In fact 
documentary theatre practitioners have been criticised for claiming their work’s 
access to the real, without revealing the presence of “highly selective manipulation 
of opinion and rhetoric” (Bottoms 58). Norton-Taylor however argues that his 
tribunal plays offer greater access to the actual event than traditional journalism, 
commenting that “any editing is subjective, but far less so when it is for a two-hour 
script than for an article of a few hundred words, or a television clip of a few 
moments. A theatre audience thus gets a much better understanding of the issues” 
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(“Spirit of Inquiry”). The final narrative that emerges, therefore, is an accurate 
reproduction but a mediated account of an event. Norton-Taylor’s framing of the 
representational limitations of documentary theatre contrasts with Hare’s 
description of Stuff Happens as the unquestionable and definitive version of events.  
 
Unlike David Hare’s problematic theological presence in Stuff Happens 
(discussed in Chapter 2) Norton-Taylor is aware of the theological presence of the 
author in documentary theatre and actively tries to reduce or make apparent his role 
in the editing and constructing of the real. He, alongside Kent, developed a rigorous 
editing protocol to ensure an accurate version of the words spoken is presented. This 
criteria includes ensuring the chronology of the events depicted is sequential and 
keeping the body of the testimony intact; while testimony can be shorn on either 
end, the body of the testimony must remain unadulterated. This unity of testimony 
means that Norton-Taylor is prevented from pairing one question with an answer to 
a different question. (Hammond and Steward 152-153). Hare’s “equating 
truthfulness with an uncompromising adherence to the actually spoken”, Soncini 
points out, “would place a considerable share of contemporary documentary work 
outside the province of verbatim” (81). Norton-Taylor provides appendices for his 
sources, the references for documents to which he refers, while the play text refers to 
the URL for the transcript to the public inquiry. Therefore, unlike Stuff Happens, the 
dialogue and events of Justifying War are verified with documented testimony. Also 
unlike Stuff Happens, there are no composite characters or fictional viewpoints to 
create narrative structure for the events. 
 
That said, in Justifying War Richard Norton-Taylor did make a minor, but 
noteworthy, change to the chronology of the testimony presented. In the play the 
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final piece of testimony is delivered by Dr Kelly’s wife, Janice; however, Janice Kelly 
actually testified two days before Dr Jones, whose testimony is performed before 
hers in Justifying War. I will discuss the larger effects of this change later, but it 
should be noted here that this change was added at the behest of Nicholas Kent who 
acknowledged that theatre audiences desired a change in tone and tempo 
(Hammond and Steward 125). Furthermore, Norton-Taylor alerted the audience to 
this alteration as each scene started with an announcement of the testimony’s date of 
delivery. The change was further noted in the play’s programme notes, and is also 
noted in the play text.  
 
The dedication of Justifying War to faithfully recreating the Hutton Inquiry 
was highlighted by critics. Charles Spencer of The Telegraph, who had been able to 
attend the actual hearing “found the verisimilitude astonishing”. Janelle Reinelt 
commented that “perhaps the most striking aspect of these productions is their un-
theatrical style… all mimicking the decorum of these hearings that are held in place 
by the high formality and the austere authority of the presiding official” (63). Reinelt 
also pointed out that the set was “so precise” in Justifying War; that the set designers 
replicated the empty bookshelves of the actual hearing, making the room look 
similarly “bleak” (63).  
 
Reviewers complimented the objectivity of Justifying War, Reinelt pointing out 
that the play asked “for the audience to judge events for themselves” (“Justifying 
War and the Case of David Kelly” 64). However, this even-handedness was largely 
criticised for its lack of political efficacy. Toby Young of The Spectator expected “to be 
outraged [...and] anticipating an eviscerating attack on the Establishment”; Nicholas 
de Jongh commented it lacked “narrative and dramatic thrust”; Sarah Hemming of 
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The Financial Times described the play as a “whodunit - but there are no dramatic 
entrances and exits, no cleverly worded revelations, no neat plot leading to a 
satisfying conclusion”. Finally, this subscription to recreating what was actually said 
was criticised by reviewers on the grounds that Justifying War did not offer any 
revelation, and denied the public any closer access to the the truth.  
 
3. Tribunals and the State of Exception 
The lack of revelation in Justifying War is a result of Norton-Taylor’s 
subscription to the idea that the text is a manifestation of the truth, requiring no 
commentary or framing devices to aid audience comprehension. His plays depict an 
edited version of what occurred at the tribunals and therefore the ability of any of 
his plays to illuminate is restricted by the content of the testimony delivered at the 
tribunal it recreates. There is an epistemological limitation in terms of what can be 
gleaned from recreating testimony and, therefore, tribunal theatre is limited in its 
ability to hold political power to account. Jacques Delcuvellerie, a member of the 
Belgian documentary theatre troupe, Groupov, admits there are limitations to the 
power of verbatim testimony in illuminating the truth, insofar as “testimony, 
whatever its quality only ever testifies to itself. It expresses what the speaker is 
capable of uttering about what she or he has lived, nothing more and nothing less. It 
establishes neither the exactitude of the facts, nor their intelligibility” (qtd. in 
Finburgh 122).  
 
In trying to defend themselves from Dr Kelly’s allegations, politicians 
demonstrated the same broad use of language as that used in their justifications for 
invading Iraq. Those that testified at the Hutton Inquiry were more concerned with 
clearing their own involvement in the case and as Megson suggests this behaviour is 
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“symptomatic of the controversially limited remit of the Inquiry itself” (116). While 
the physical evidence for an invasion of Iraq was manipulated or created to disrupt 
access to the truth, in Justifying War access to the truth is also restricted by the 
individual performances of those who testify and their use of language. Norton-
Taylor points out that “Not even those rehearsed for the witness box and questioned 
by well-prepared lawyers talk in soundbites. The language, the use of words [...] is 
full of subtleties and nuances as they try to protect themselves, dissemble or pass the 
buck [...] Few, if any, tell the full truth” (“Spirit of Enquiry”). Colleran argues that for 
all of its verisimilitude, rather than being “courtroom drama” designed to illuminate 
the true version of events, Justifying War has more in common with a “social drama” 
(147). Colleran compares Norton-Taylor to Chekhov, insofar as Norton-Taylor hears 
in his testimony “the note of self-revelation or self deception [...] whether it be “in 
repeated deferrals, a self incriminating pause, excessive self-justification”. 
Furthermore, like Chekhov’s characters, those who give testimony in Justifying War 
“press their own cause and underhear each other”, pointing to the fact that the 
speakers are “addressing a larger audience than each other, correcting narratives 
already presented, and asserting the value of their particular viewpoint” (147). 
Colleran’s assessment of the behaviour demonstrated in Justifying War aligns with 
the opinion of legal scholar Graham White who argues that when witnesses take to 
the stand there is a “self-conscious ‘play’ of witness performance - self presentation, 
demeanour and verbal and physical fluency at the site of a particular, intractable 
form of challenge to attempts to construct a definitive legal record” (337). 
 
Therefore, tribunal theatre’s reliance on what is said at the tribunals they 
recreate restricts the potential for the theatre to be a space that holds political power 
to account. Soncini agrees, stating that  
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when dealing with the increasingly extralegal forms of warfare of the 
contemporary era, the revelatory power of theatre as juridical space is 
considerably diminished by these self-imposed dependence on the 
happenstance of official documents (Soncini 92).  
This is because the event that tribunal theatre is staging, the tribunal, is an extension 
of the wider apparatus of the sovereign during a state of exception. The tribunal 
instead of being a place of justice becomes a space where the exception is enacted 
through legal performances.  
 
4. Legal Performances  
Agamben argues that the state of exception is a “space devoid of law” as a 
sovereign cannot be judged by a judiciary for their extra-legal activity as there is no 
legal framework for these actions to be judged against (51). Therefore, any judgment 
or inquiry into the actions of the sovereign during this time is inherently a 
performative form of justice.  
 
Megson argues that tribunals can represent confused boundaries, similar to 
Agamben’s ideas of the anomie, between government and its institutions which 
should be separated to keep sovereign power in check (103). Megson points to the 
notions of political community and institutional structures as laid out by Kenneth 
Dyson in The State Tradition in Western Europe (1980), in which he argues societies 
manifest conceptual ethical “values” which should find “embodiment” in the state’s 
institutions (206). These apparatuses of the state should promote a “depersonalized” 
power that is immutable, contrasting with the ever-changing government as found 
in liberal democracies (206). However, as discussed earlier, during a state of 
exception, there is no clear separation of powers as the sovereign’s exceptional 
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power creates a “standstill or suspension of the law” (Agamben, State of Exception 
42). 
 
In Nicole Roger’s article “Terrorist v Sovereign: Legal performances in a state of 
exception” she argues that in a state of exception, certain legal proceedings 
concerning exceptional acts by the government, such as illegal detainees in 
Guantanamo, are reduced to a performative function, which she describes as a 
mutual dependency (163). These legal performances, Rogers argues, fall into one of 
three categories: black holes in which “the courts refuse to judge the actions of the 
executive”, grey holes “in which the courts conduct only a procedural review and 
ignore the substance of the rule of law” or a final category in which, “the courts have 
demonstrated an adherence to the rule of law and a resistance to the Kafka-esque 
qualities of the state of exception” (164). Ultimately the tribunal, like the tribunal 
play, is reduced to a performance, wherein we witness “justice” in action but not in 
effect. The rule of law is essentially diluted. For this reason David Dyzenhaus has 
labelled these legal grey holes the most dangerous as they “place a thin veneer of 
legality on the political” (50). Dyzenhaus’ comments echo Agamben’s description of 
law and fact: 
if it has been effectively said that in a state of exception, fact is converted into 
law the opposite is also true, that is, that an inverse movement also acts in the 
state of exception, by which law is suspended and obliterated in fact. The 
essential point, in any case, is that a threshold of undecidability is produced at 
which factum and ius fade into each other. (State of Exception 29) 
I would argue that Justifying War exposes the Hutton Inquiry as a legal performance 
operating in a legal grey hole, in which the courts conduct a review of these 




Gupta contends that the public tribunal’s primary aims are geared toward 
sating the public desire for performances of justice as opposed to justice itself. He 
argues that  
much functioning of public institutions [such as tribunals] depends on meeting 
public demands by presenting a satisfying public process or display rather than 
reaching just or desired outcomes. That the process of a hearing is seen to be 
undertaken is arguably more socially expedient than the outcome that is 
reached. (118) 
Reinelt argues that the public are attracted to tribunals as they offer a form of 
catharsis “from the performance [of justice], if not from the actual workings of 
justice” (“Towards a Poetics of Theatre” 80). While at least subliminally, the public 
are aware that they are living in “a world of simulation”, Reinelt contends they want 
to “experience the assertion of the materiality of events, the indisputable character of 
the facts [and this is] one reason why trials and hearings, given force of law, have so 
much resonance” (81-82). Through the repetition of the ‘facts’ of the case, the ‘truth’ 
of the events can be obtained, due to a “deep collective urge for the link between 
knowledge and truth” (82). Reinelt points out that the public’s desire for justice to be 
sated through the mere repetition of the facts is ideological. Referencing Slavoj 
Žižek’s work on the links between ideology and truth, Reinelt points out that 
audiences know that documents, facts, and evidence are always mediated 
when they are received; they know there is no raw truth apart from 
interpretation, but still, they want to experience the assertion of the materiality 
of events, of the indisputable character of the facts - one reason why trials and 




Following Reinelt’s argument, we can understand that public interest in the 
Hutton Inquiry was due to a larger feeling of ongoing anxiety surrounding Dr 
Kelly’s death and overarching concerns about the legality of the Iraq war. Through 
the repetition of the facts the public could both understand and construct 
meaningful narratives about the events in question. However, the facts that are 
repeated are the ones deemed worthwhile by a tribunal established by the very 
government whose extralegal activities are the cause of the death they are 
investigating. At the same time the possibly illegal invasion of Iraq, by that same 
government, goes unjudged. 
 
Justifying War may not have achieved Norton-Taylor’s aim of “cutting through 
these layers of duplicity until an accurate, not always orderly account emerged” of 
the events that surrounded the death of Dr Kelly (qtd. in Hammond and Steward 
105). However Justifying War, instead  
puts into perspective something that was widely perceived at the time that the 
courtroom, the public hearing, the press conference and the official meeting are 
all theatre. These spaces of social reality are used to manage belief and disbelief 
in the public, just as theatre manages the belief and disbelief of audiences. 
(Gupta, 117)  
Justifying War exposes democratic institutions that have both been corrupted by 
and abet exceptional behaviour. Megson argues that one of the strengths of tribunal 
theatre is to expose how state institutions can become complicit in the actions of 
government, which is part of a wider array of “confused boundaries between public, 
government and party interest” (112). Ultimately, according to Megson, “the 
Tricycle’s approach [...] is to annex the resources of documentary theatre to expose 
the democratic deficit in the wider political culture” while also illuminating “the 
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effects and implications of endemic structural weaknesses within the British state” 
(113, 110). Furthermore, Justifying War highlights how sovereigns can utilise 
exceptional powers to give their claims the force of truth. Nels P. Highberg argues 
that “a core value of documentary theatre [...] is the extent to which it encourages 
audience to recognise the damaging effects of singular impositions of truth within 
society” (167). The Hutton Inquiry was seen as ignoring the elephant in the room: 
the government’s misleading of its citizens regarding its case for an invasion of Iraq. 
What this points to is an institution that is ineffectual in its ability to bring truth to 
light or, even more worryingly still, an institution that is prevented from arriving at 
the truth by the constraints placed upon it by an executive branch of the 
government. As Soncini point out one of the strengths of Justifying War is not to 
reveal truth but rather its ability to 
shed light on another troubling reality emerging from the tribunal transcripts, 
that is to say the virtual impossibility of reconstructing top-level decision 
making procedures leading to Britain’s involvement in the Iraq war due to an 
alarming dearth of official records. (91-92) 
 
5. Justice and the Homo Sacer  
In highlighting the exceptional behaviour of the sovereign and the spaces 
wherein the exception is enacted, the play also highlights the other pole of sovereign 
exception: the homo sacer. Sovereign power is established in the state of exception by 
excluding bare human life. This is achieved through the judicial order withdrawing 
from this bare life and abandoning it (Agamben, Homo Sacer 18). For the sovereign to 
behave exceptionally, bare life, or the homo sacer, must be abandoned by the law. The 
homo sacer is an individual or group of individuals whom the sovereign can place 
outside the rule of law, stripped of their legal rights. The first homo sacer highlighted 
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in Justifying War is the general public. I have previously described how citizens are 
excluded from justice insofar as journalists fail to report on government tribunals in 
a meaningful way and how the justice is often performative. While citizens are often 
physically excluded from the spaces of justice, Justifying War allows citizens to 
democratically engage with the machinations of sovereign power. 
 
However, Justifying War highlights a more specific homo sacer that was created 
during the Hutton Tribunal, also physically and symbolically excluded from the 
space of justice: David and Janice Kelly. Agamben outlines that if law is suspended 
then “the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the 
relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law” (State of 
Exception 1). The living being is legally recognised, however they have no legal 
rights. In this sense the homo sacer in a court of law lacks protection and a voice in 
which to defend itself. Both the Kellys’ voices embody the voiceless homo sacer; they 
are seen to be speaking, but their voices carry no value. Mladen Dolar argues that in 
a state of exception “everybody [can] hear everybody else’s voices” but the content 
of that voice is circumstantial (109). Colleran likens this isolation from the 
democratic process to characters from realist drama, wherein the Kellys seem to be 
from “a social drama by Henrik Ibsen or Arthur Miller, which clarifies the nature of 
opposing forces and focuses on the individual caught between them” (147). The state 
of exception realises a fictionalised democracy wherein the voice must be seen to be 
used, but what it expresses is unimportant. If the exceptional acts of justice are 
reduced to a performative function, then so is the ability of the homo sacer to engage 




The homo sacer appeals to ancient Roman law regarding specific people who 
can be killed without consequence. The framing of the Hutton Inquiry highlights 
how, from the moment he leaked information to the BBC, Dr Kelly was deemed a 
sacrificial lamb for sovereign power. This fact was seized upon by Labour minister 
Andrew MacKinlay during the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee that Dr 
Kelly was called to shortly before his death. He later redelivered this exchange at the 
Hutton Inquiry. 
MACKINLAY: I reckon you are chaff; you have been thrown up to divert 
our probing. Have you ever felt like a fall guy? You have 
been set up have you not? (Norton-Taylor Justifying War 
58) 
Mackinlay at the Hutton Inquiry clarifies what he means by chaff. 
MACKINLAY: Well, chaff to a weapons expert is what is thrown out by 
our destroyers and from our fighter aircraft to deflect 
incoming - 
DINGEMANS:  Exocet missiles? 
MACKINLAY:  Absolutely. No offence was meant. Our Committee - the 
paradox, the irony was that my Committee did suffer 
from chaff because we were successively diverted. 
(Norton-Taylor, Justifying War 58) 
 
Reinelt argues that Kelly’s “suicide is tragic only insofar as it shows an individual 
broken by the state power whose role is to shelter and protect its citizens” (67); he 
was a government employee stripped of his rights to privacy, as a member of the 
Intelligence service, labelled a traitor to distract from the political fallout. While the 
Hutton Inquiry was set up to investigate the death of Dr Kelly, there was little 
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attempt to discuss him as human being; instead his life was reduced to being a 
scapegoat. However, as Reinelt identifies, “Kelly can get lost in the story of the parry 
and thrust of press and governmental struggles” rendering him “a casualty of 
political rhetoric and power scrambles” (“Justifying War and the Case of David 
Kelly” 64-67). 
 
The reduction of Kelly to homo sacer is further seen through the appropriation of 
Kelly’s own voice. Through selected anecdotes and diary entries, Kelly’s words are 
taken out of context to scrutinize his professional standing, while the deceased Kelly 
is afforded no right of reply. Hughes points out that over the course of the play there 
is a “gradual decay and diminishment of Dr Kelly’s forensic voice” (Performance in a 
Time of Terror 103). For example in this exchange with Andrew Gilligan, a reporter 
for the BBC, reading from his own notes: 
GILLIGAN: He said: ‘It was transformed in the week before publication’. I 
said: To make it sexier? And he said: Yes to make it sexier. 
(Norton-Taylor Justifying War, 14) 
The tribunal’s use of Kelly’s “forensic voice” to allow his past words to speak on his 
behalf, is inadequate and is more prone to being “reinvented and parodied across 
different speech economies” than to be a meaningful attempt to recreate his thoughts 
and opinions (Hughes Performance in a Time of Terror 103). Throughout the play there 
are multiple conflicting versions of Dr Kelly’s statements; Hughes points to how the 
media would turn his words into sound bites, while government officials “used 
aggressive and defensive speech patterns to strip [...] his words of their precision” 
(Performance in a Time of Terror 103-104). Reinelt also notes that Dr Kelly’s secretive 
nature and a “marriage of not sharing confidences” meant that his own wife’s 
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account of him “suffers from her lack of knowledge of his feelings or his own 
indisposition to speech” (Reinelt, “Justifying War and the Case of David Kelly” 67).  
 
In Justifying War, just like in the Hutton Inquiry, Janice Kelly’s testimony was 
delivered aurally via a phone link. In the play, the actor (Sally Giles) delivered her 
lines into a microphone located in an upstairs changing room separate to the 
performance space. A large proportion of the positive critical response for Justifying 
War was reserved for Janice Kelly’s testimony (Nathan; deJongh). Paul Taylor wrote 
that “he would never forget the brief harrowing silence at the other end of the line 
before Janice Kelly, hitherto steady and stoic, confirms that the painkiller her 
husband used was the medication that she takes for her arthritis”. Janice Kelly’s 
testimony was placed at the end of the play when chronologically it occurred second 
to last. This choice, to reverse the chronological order of the testimony given by 
Janice Kelly and Dr Jones in the play, was defended by Soncini who argued that no 
other piece of testimony could have followed hers. It was the natural “tragic climax” 
of the tribunal, separated and distinguished enough from the other pieces insofar 
that “the dignified testimony rendered by Janice Kelly adds a moving personal note 
that creates a powerful contrast with the dispassionate objectivity of the inquisitorial 
procedure” (91). Janice Kelly’s testimony is filled with emotional anecdotal 
recollections of Dr Kelly, regarding how they met, their marriage, how they would 
spend their weekends and of course her account of their final moments together:  
DINGEMANS: How would you describe him at this time? 
KELLY:  Oh, I just thought he had a broken heart. He looked as 
though he had shrunk, but I had no idea at that stage of 
what he might do later, absolutely no idea at all. He could 
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not put two sentences together. He could not talk at all 
(Norton-Taylor, Justifying War 92). 
It is reminder that, while this was an inquiry of national interest, it centred on a 
personal tragedy. However, like her husband’s voice, Janice Kelly’s voice is 
diminished in its presentation and execution. While Dr Kelly’s voice is diminished 
by others taking his words and stripping them of meaning, Janice Kelly is physically 
barred from the room, her voice piped through an audio link and, as in the tribunal 
itself, the sound quality is wavering.  
 
Hughes argues that the Kellys’ testimony is representative of the “failure of 
forensic voice in our time” (Performance in a Time of Terror 104). Taking issue with 
critics who “argued that the inclusion of Janice Kelly’s voice as part of a public 
inquiry signified a hopeful and critical incarnation of democratic sphere” (96), 
Hughes suggests that her testimony reflects a level of ”uncertainty about how to act 
in a complex and changing world, rather than its institution of certainty and 
affirmation of democracy” (Performance in a Time of Terror 100). Hughes argues that 
Janice Kelly’s testimony does not symbolise a healthy participatory democracy in 
which the judicial system is based on a “non-coercive and regulated contest for 
better argument based on the best available information”. But rather that Janice 
Kelly’s testimony “demonstrates little other than an appropriation of the power of 
her voice in order to maintain the political of a democratic, rule-bound universe 
during a time of democratic crisis” (Performance in a Time of Terror 97). She is heard 
but not seen. Her voice represents a schism, Hughes argues, from the tribunal's 
structured proceedings; due to the technology used to deliver her testimony her 
voice falters and fails highlighting the lack of power that her voice has in this realm. 
In contrast with Dingemans, Hutton or Campbell, whose voices are powerful and 
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present, Janice Kelly’s voice both in the play and the actual tribunal, physically 
excluded from the space of power, is frail and mediated which cements “a sensation 
of justice being done rather than justice being critically interrogated” (Performance in 
a Time of Terror 98).  
 
Janice Kelly’s voice demonstrates that in the state of exception, some voices 
are privileged and others are not. In this sense we could think of the state of 
exception as state of exclusion. Her voice is weakened and removed from the space. 
She is unique in that she does not represent the media, a government organisation or 
department; she instead represents a traumatised and distorted voice, one that does 
not know how to operate or to be heard in this place of exception. By positioning her 
testimony at the end, Norton-Taylor does not offer us a moment of democratic hope, 
but rather a reminder of how these voices are excluded in a state of exception and 
are little more than a footnote in the ‘judicial process’. To emphasise the power 
imbalance Colleran points to the ending of the play wherein Janice Kelly 
“pathetically… thanks Lord Hutton for the dignity of the proceedings - though the 
competition of self-vindication could hardly be described as ‘dignified’” (148).  
 
Soncini argues that Justifying War represents “a disturbing democratic deficit 
[...] and the epistemological limitations of the tribunal play [...and] the tribunal 
playwright’s exclusive reliance on existing legal records as a guarantee of 
truthfulness and legitimacy ultimately works against the documentarian ambition to 
recover the truth” (92). Therefore, Soncini concludes, because of these limitations, 
Justifying War fails to illuminate the facts leading to the death of David Kelly. 
However, I would argue that Justifying War succeeds in demystifying the political 
processes and events surrounding the tribunal, rather than the actual events the 
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tribunal was trying to clarify. If we follow Megson’s argument that “the achievement 
of tribunal theatre is to offer the audience synchronous ‘re-play’ of forensic 
inquisitorial examination, the cumulative effect of which is to indict the ‘rot at the 
top’” (123), then ultimately, Justifying War reveals the performative nature of the 
state of exception in its relation to the law. It demonstrates the legal performative 
role of state tribunals and the wider ineffectual nature of state institutions; the 
language and behaviour of the politicians demonstrates the exceptional language 
and behaviour used to keep the truth at bay, while the treatment and exclusion of 
the Kellys is exemplary of the treatment of the homo sacer. The Hutton Inquiry was a 
performance of justice, and, therefore, Justifying War is a performance of a 
performance. The play is not a signal of the triumph of democracy but rather an 






I WANT YOU 
CARYL CHURCHILL AND DRUNK ENOUGH TO SAY I LOVE YOU (2006) 
 
 
The previous plays examined within this thesis have primarily focused on 
depicting exceptional sovereigns during the Iraq war period and how they have 
used the state of exception to deceive their citizens. However, neither play has 
represented on stage the deceived citizen, or as this thesis has labeled them, the 
twenty-first century homo sacer. The homo sacer is referred to by Agamben as the other 
pole of sovereign exception (Homo Sacer, 110), insofar as they are inversely effected 
by the sovereign’s exceptional will. The life of homo sacer is suspended outside of the 
law, due to the exceptional actions of the sovereign. If most citizens are now homo 
sacer, understanding the relationship between homo sacer and the exceptional 
sovereign is key to understanding twenty-first century life.      
 
The relationship between the sovereign and the twenty-first century homo sacer 
is represented in Caryl Churchill’s Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? (2006). Opening 
at The Royal Court Theatre, London on 10 November 2006, the play dramatises an 
abusive, homosexual relationship between Guy and Sam. However, Sam is not a 
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man but an entire country; he is the personification of the United States, as in Uncle 
Sam. Sam is controlling and abusive; he demands ever more love and loyalty from 
Guy. Simultaneously, Sam’s brazen use of power leads him to commit atrocities 
around the world. If Guy does not support Sam in these actions, Sam begins to 
threaten Guy and is emotionally witholding. Guy is initially enamoured by Sam’s 
power and rhetoric, but by the end of the play, disgusted by Sam’s violent actions, is 
too scared to leave him. Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? was described by Soncini as 
Churchill’s “first post-9/11 play proper” (37). However, the play does not focus 
solely on exceptional actions by America post 2001. Churchill’s play chronicles the 
wider context of American exceptionalism from the genocide of Native Americans to 
Abu Ghraib, through eight short scenes that simultaneously document Sam and 
Guy’s abusive relationship. For Churchill, the invasion of Iraq was indicative of 
historical American foreign policy 
Some people seemed surprised by the Iraq War as if it was an aberration caused 
by Bush and the neocons, but though it’s an extreme example it’s not so 
different from the general thrust of American policy for most of its history, and 
part of my point in writing the play was precisely that this was not just 
something that had come with Bush and would go away after him (ix-x). 
 
While the play’s historical scope is vast, the timeline is muddied, so events from 
the Korean, Vietnamese and both Gulf Wars occur concurrently. The larger effect of 
this, according to Soncini, is to stress the “substantive historical continuities between 
the United States steady recourse to war in order to achieve and consolidate the 
global supremacy of American ‘democracy’, and the more recent elevation of this 




This chapter contends that Sam and Guy’s relationship is an allegory for the 
violent and unbalanced relationship between the sovereign and their citizens whose 
lives are increasingly more precarious and affected by the whims of the sovereign, 
which in turn renders them “virtual homines sacri” (Hannah 71). This chapter will 
discuss Caryl Churchill’s attempts to disrupt her plays’s relationship to the real. 
Unlike Stuff Happens and Justifying War, which have dramatised or recreated specific 
historical events, Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? uses metaphor, a stylised ellipitcal 
dialogue and disrupts the play’s linearity through a dual timeline system which 
renders Sam and Guy’s relationship in a linear fashion, while the historical record 
occurs out of sequence. The wider effect of this is to “defamiliarize the very 
recognisable politics” of American exceptionalism that are discussed in the play 
(Adiseshiah, 118). It is my assertion that the secondary function of these artistic 
choices made by Churchill is that they successfully demonstrate her pursuit of new 
forms that avoid authorial problems regarding her work’s relationship to the truth. 
Churchill cannot be accused of misleading her public if she is so blatantly disrupting 
her work’s links to the real. These artistic choices employed by Churchill will be also 
be considered with reference to Harry Derbyshire’s article “Caryl Churchill’s 21st 
Poetics” in which he argues that Churchill’s work exemplifies the vision of feminist 
theatre described in Sue-Ellen Case’s “Towards a New Poetics” (367). This chapter 
will also unpack how these changes not only disrupt the play’s relationship to the 
real, but also evoke the wider context of American exceptionalism. This chapter will 
go on to examine Churchill’s stylised dialogue and draw from Hannah Arendt’s 
theory on the “Banality of Evil.” Finally this chapter will discuss how Churchill 
merges the personal with the political by staging the state of exception as an abusive 
relationship, wherein Guy is cast as the homo sacer to Sam’s sovereign. This 
relationship is analogous to Agamben’s writing on “the space that is opened when 
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the state of exception begins to become the rule” wherein the sovereign is “able to 
dominate life within the walls of the camp” establishing what Bhandar calls “The 
New Normal”. (Homo Sacer, 168; Hannah 63; Bhandar 261).  
 
1. “New Forms” of Truth 
Churchill has a long history of writing politically charged work, that 
“frustrates attempts at critical categorisation” (Biber, 149). This is due to her 
subscription to the Brechtian concept of developmental theatre, wherein 
theatremakers should search for new theatrical forms that relate to new social 
conditions (149). Churchill argues that “Playwrights don’t give answers, they ask 
questions. We need to find new questions, which may help us answer the old ones or 
make unimportant, and this means new subjects and new forms” (qtd. in. Rogers 
xxvi). Over the past two decades, Churchill’s work has become increasingly focussed 
on political institutions, as opposed to her earlier work, such as Cloud 9 (1979) and 
Top Girls (1982), which focussed on gender or sexual politics. Soncini argues that this 
trend in Churchill’s work has been “paralleled by [her] very active and visible role as 
a political campaigner in the public arena” and a concern over the “aesthetic, ethical 
and epistemological problems involved in the theatrical representation” of new 
forms of conflict and the surrounding politics on stage (29).  
 
Derbyshire argues that Churchill’s post-2000 work focussing on political 
institutions, (of which Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? is a part) has brought about a 
discernible change in the form of theatre she is pursuing. This work, which includes 
Far Away (2000), A Number (2002), Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? (2006), Seven 
Jewish Children (2009), Love and Information (2012) and Ding Dong the Wicked (2013), 
rejects formal notions of characters, dialogue and linearity (Derbyshire 372). Unlike 
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the work discussed by Hare and Norton-Taylor, Churchill has distanced and 
disrupted the link between Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? and the real. As opposed 
to depicting real events, her work is an analogy, casting Sam as representative of the 
entirety of the American government, while the exception is dramatised through a 
series of dates between Sam and Guy. Churchill’s decision to utilise metaphor to 
depict contemporary events reduces her theological presence in her work. 
 
Derbyshire argues that Churchill’s post-2000 work, is representative of the 
feminist theatre offered in Sue-Ellen Case’s “Towards a New Poetics”, wherein Case 
envisaged a new theatre which rejected or disrupted traditional forms of theatrical 
representation. Case’s new form of theatre, feminist in intent, was constructed 
through four main tenets: breaking with realism, constructing woman as a subject, 
deviating from linearity and offering ambiguous endings. Observing these tenets 
would allow for a rise of a new poetics that would “abandon the traditional 
patriarchal values embedded in prior notions of form, practice and audience 
response in order to construct new critical models and methodologies” (Case 114-
115). Derbyshire connects Case’s theory to Brecht’s epic theatre, insofar as Brecht 
and Case both argue that the real in art creates on stage the endemic inequalities of 
society, “reifying the familiar as seemingly inevitable” (372). The move away from 
realism allows the audience to interpret the play and therefore the world as they see 
fit, removes the playwright from their position of patriarchal authorship and 
“insist[s] on the active involvement of directors, performers and audiences in the 
interpretation and ultimately, the creation of [the play’s] meaning” (Derbyshire 382). 
While Derbyshire acknowledges that Churchill has never formally endorsed Case’s 
framework, it does provide a powerful tool in understanding the formal rejection of 
realistic tenets in Churchill’s later work. Similarly, Churchill’s drive towards ‘new 
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poetics’ or a new form distances her from ‘patriarchal’ authors such as Hare but also 
distances her from the exceptional truth claims of the patriarchal sovereign upon 
which she wishes to shine a light.  
 
For Siân Adiseshiah, Churchill's rejections of realism leave the audience 
“excluded and dispersed rather than constituted as spectating subjects. The audience 
is therefore prevented from occupying a privileged viewing position” which she 
argues is the de facto position of the twenty-first century citizen (115). The staging of 
the play at the Royal Court heightened the exclusion of the audience. The set was 
contained within a proscenium covered with light bulbs that lit up between scenes, 
while invisible stage hands caught the props (cups, cigarettes) which Sam and Guy 
discarded over the side of the couch. Soncini argues this mise en scène gestures “self-
reflexively towards the play’s own aesthetic framing of the violence and brutality of 
war, thereby implicitly questioning the role of the position of the audience” (38). The 
Royal Court production’s set, designed by Eugene Lee, reflected the play’s inherent 
structural contradictions “as it contained the domestic intimacy of the sofa with the 
epic scale of the dialogue” (Roberts 159). We are “couch warriors” watching 
“sanitized and aestheticized” versions of conflict, which Soncini refers to as 
“atrocitainment” (38-9). The audience are separated from the atrocities that their 
governments are commiting; this separation is only intensified when we watch it 
from our comfortable sofas in our safe neighbourhoods that have been provided by 
sovereign Uncle Sam. 
 
Churchill also disrupts the play links to reality through her use of highly 
fractured and elliptical language which according to Churchill, is “a sampling of 
phrases from much longer conversations” (qtd. in Roberts 162), a decision made by 
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Churchil due to her belief that “so often dialogue works better if you take lots of it 
away” (qtd. in Goodman 94). This is a much more extreme version of the dialogue 
Churchill was experimenting with in some of her earlier work such as A Number 
(2002) and Hotel (1997) wherein there are no complete sentences or punctuation. The 
dialogue in Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? is constructed from fragmented 
utterances, described by Dan Rebellato as “violently incomplete”, that say very little, 
but at the same time hint at more violent behaviour left unsaid (33). For Adiseshiah, 
these disruptions in Drunk Enough to Say I Love You duplicate the experience of 
omission of twenty-first century political subjectivity (115). The words spoken by 
Guy and Sam are clipped so the audience catch glimpses of what the characters are 
discussing but the larger narrative is lost: 
  GUY  icecaps 
 SAM  who fucking care about 
 GUY  floods 
 SAM  because we’ll all be dead by the time it 
 GUY  another hurricane moving towards 
 SAM  natural 
 GUY  but it’s greater than 
 SAM  natural disasters 
 GUY  not coping very 
 SAM  surprise 
 GUY  predicted and there is an element of manmade 
 SAM  stop fucking going on about 
 GUY  carbon 




This erosion of language is representative of how sovereigns use exceptional 
language during a state of exception, and evokes the wider destabilisation of the 
post-9/11 era (Adiseshiah 40), wherein the public has enough information to grasp 
what is being discussed but lacks the specifics to spatially coordinate themselves 
meaningfully in the discussion. Information exists in this anomic zone where it is 
simultaneously knowable but resists interpretation. Yeliz Biber argues that 
Churchill’s use of dialogue creates an “awareness of the operation of language in 
mind as the audience is apparently expected to fill in the blanks through a process of 
mental association” (150-151). Biber further argues that this use of dialogue by 
Churchill “confounds the audience [...but] also position[s] the historical and current 
American foreign policies within a framework of terror” (151). Ian Dickinson’s 
sound design for The Royal Court’s production emphasised how citizens are often 
unaware of the exceptional actions undertaken by sovereigns. Dickinson 
interspersed the play with the cocking of guns, preparing of armaments and other 
“threatening sound effects and terrifying music”, hinting at the violence which is 
discussed but never seen (Biber 151).  
 
Aiding this framework of terror is Churchill’s utilisation of a dual timeline in 
her work, wherein Sam and Guy’s relationship unfurls in a linear manner, while the 
historical timeline is distorted. Churchill clarifies that “the love story is chronological 
and that is the story the actors play [... while the political events] can be taken from 
anytime but are happening now, in the moment, for the characters” (x). Each scene is 
dedicated to listing the historical account of a specific form of American 
exceptionalism including propaganda (scene two), shock and awe tactics that 
inadvertently kill innocent civilians (scene three), aggressive protectionism and 
economic exploitation of the third world (scene four) and institutionalised practices 
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of torture at locations such as Guantanamo Bay (scene seven). Soncini notes that as 
Sam and Guy’s personal relationship develops over the course of the play, the 
historical record “rewinds and restarts from the beginning with each new conflict 
scenario”; the effect is to create a play which goes through “endless cycles and loops 
and ultimately subsumes the linear narrative of the love story within its repetitive 
circular motion”(41). Derbyshire argues that Churchill’s compacting of her play’s 
historical timeframe is modelled after Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on Philosophy of 
History”. Unlike a dominant historicist approach that sees history as a process of 
transition reflected by history’s victors, Benjamin proposes a model of historical 
materialism which “supplies a unique experience with the past” which makes it 
possible to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger” (Benjamin 
262; 255). Instead of rendering these events as occuring chronologically, the play 
sheds light on the historical nature of American exceptionalism; these are not one off 
events but inherent feature of American politics.  
 
By rejecting realism and linearity, Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? creates a 
new way to frame American exceptionalism, which Adiseshiah argues counters the 
current subject position for twenty-first century citizens, which she describes being 
one of “uncertainty, bewilderment and paralysis” (112). Churchill unlike Hare does 
not try to unpack the conditions that allow exceptionalism to arise nor does she 
“provide the audience with information that might allow them to trace how one 
thing has led to another in conventional plot terms” (Derbyshire 378).  
 
2. Sovereign Sam 
Churchill’s pursuit of non-realistic forms not only reduces her authorial claim 
to the truth but also augments the exceptional behaviour of Sam, ergo the United 
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States, that Churchill documents in Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? The non-realistic 
premise, that of a man falling in love with a country, and setting reaffirms that Sam 
and Guy are removed from reality as we know it and are instead moulding reality in 
a manner that suits Sam’s own ends. Nicole Rogers comments “that the world 
[according to Sam] is processed according to American beliefs [...] there are no 
shades in Sam’s world. He thinks globally only for the promotion of US interests” 
(160). Sam sees the world as it could be, not how it is, a world that is entirely 
subservient to US interests. These beliefs echo Karl Rove’s comments to Ron 
Suskind, discussed in the introduction to this thesis, that the White House perceives 
the world in the way they wish to shape it, while everyone else is part of the ‘reality 
based community’. We are shown a laid out plan of American exceptionalism. Sam 
is the “possessor of truth”; he creates the world order that Guy perceives (Soncini 
45). For instance, when Guy attempts to challenge Sam’s exploitation of third world 
economies: 
GUY just trying to understand exactly 
SAM essential because we consume more than half the goods in the 
world so you can’t 
GUY ok ok and privatisation a condition 
SAM because private means free 
GUY ok  
SAM problem with that? 
GUY just low today, I can’t quite 
SAM better get a grip 
GUY ok so it’s access for our goods 
SAM  come on we’ve done debt cancellation here 
GUY yes I 
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SAM and massive aid 
GUY linked to  
SAM what is the matter with you? 
GUY pointing out that its 80% our own companies that benefit from 
SAM generosity (286-287) 
Sam equates privatisation with freedom and inequitable trade conditions as 
charitable. Furthermore, when in scene three Guy attempts to discuss civilian 
injuries during the US sponsored Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s, Sam simply replies 
that he is “not that interested [...] not that interested in civilians numbers [...] need to 
get on” (282).  
  
The Royal Court production depicted Sam and Guy losing touch with reality 
when the couch they were seated on slowly rose into the air, which Roberts argues 
represented America as “isolated and comfortable, surveying the world as a toy to 
be played with, manipulated as and when, brought into line if it strays, and bent 
inexorably to the will of Uncle Sam” (162). Despite the couple’s discussion centring 
on violence and warfare, Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? keeps any visual imagery 
of war or exceptional acts off the stage; the play’s language makes no specific claims 
but allows the audience to fill in the gaps. In not showing any images of the violence 
that is described in the play, Soncini argues that Churchill creates a “scenic 
metaphor” of war which reveals how much is hidden regarding contemporary 
conflict and our reliance on often distorted imagery to understand it (39). Soncini 
further notes that the word ‘war’ never figures in their exchanges outside the titular 
reference to the ‘Second World War’ (40). From an Agambean perspective this 
highlights how exceptional actions by the sovereign are often hidden away or 
constructed in such a way that the truth is inaccessible. This is not a war, but an 
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intervention. The individual in Guantanamo Bay is not a prisoner of war but an 
enemy combatant or terrorist. 
 
Churchill’s dual timeline system also highlights the historical nature of 
American exceptionalism. While Sam and Guy’s relationship plays out in a linear 
fashion, each scene is a compacted timeline based around a ‘theme’ of American 
exceptionalism, such as this exchange on American intervention abroad: 
SAM bombing Vietnam now, bombing Grenada, bombing Korea, 
bombing Laos, bombing Guatemala, bombing Cuba, bombing El 
Salvador, bombing Iraq, bombing Somalia, bombing Lebanon 
GUY but it’s Israel bombing 
SAM  so? Bombing Bosnia, bombing Cambodia, bombing Libya, 
bombing 
GUY used to be a village and now 
SAM because we want it gone. (283) 
Soncini argues that Churchill’s compartmentalising of these forms of exceptionalism 
evokes “the story of America’s endless wars [...] according to principles of circularity 
and contiguity” (40). Ultimately, it emphasises the continuity and vastness of 
America’s exceptionalism. Regimes may change, but the American political machine 
stays the same. In the second scene of the play, Sam discusses the genocide of the 
Native American people occuring at the same time as the invasion of Iraq. 
Derbyshire argues that by Churchill “render[ing] Guantanamo simultaneous with 
Nicaragua” she connects “historically disparate events which are illustrative of 
arguably identical political priorities and motivations” (379). Ultimately, Churchill 
rendering history in the manner serves to emphasise America’s legacy of 
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exceptionalism without endorsing “the notion that history is over or in any sense 
complete” (Buse qtd. in Derbyshire 379).  
 
The play’s blurring of time and location further emphasises the sovereign’s 
own blurred role; Sam is not only shown to be transgressing international and 
domestic law but transgressing the laws of time and space as well: 
 SAM   got to plant bombs in the hotels in Havana 
 GUY  yes ok ok the Cuban exiles in Miami are just 
 SAM  and get the money to Iraq 
 GUY  done it, the Iraqi National accord have the 
 SAM  and have they destabilised Saddam yet? No [...] desperate for 
 GUY  mujahedeen 
SAM  yes yes train the 
GUY  so ok that’s something really  
SAM  stop at nothing, flaying, explosions, whole villages 
GUY  and here we’re getting on with the assassinations (297-298) 
We never see Sam or Guy carry out any of these actions; they simply recline on a 
leather couch, witnessing the world being shaped by Sam’s immense power. 
 
The fractured dialogue of Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? is suggestive of 
Sam’s exceptionalism; its abstruse quality evokes the opaque role and surreptitious 
operation of the sovereign. The elliptical language used in Drunk Enough to Say I Love 
You? betrays a political system that operates by purposely being opaque and 
surreptitious. Similar to the actions of a sovereign in a state of exception, Sam and 
Guy’s language is at the same time both vague and conspicuous. Despite the horrific 
connotations of their conversations, neither man shows any emotional or intellectual 
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connection to the words they are speaking; their words, to Guy and Sam at least, 
become empty signifiers. Amelia Howe Kritzer argues that their exchanges are 
merely reduced to lists and cliches and coupled with “the common place nature of 
their relationship [...] brings to mind Hannah Arendt’s study of Nazi leaders and 
observations regarding the banality of evil” (Howe Kritzer 527). Their language 
consists of violent acts that are stripped of any emotional connotations and simply 
are treated as a list of words. For example in their discussion regarding chemical 
weapons: 




SAM sarin on Laos 
GUY yay 
SAM and biological too the most advanced [...] exporting anthrax to 
Iraq, botulism, histoplasma capsulatum 
GUY e-coli? 
SAM e-coli, DNA 
GUY this stuff against Kurds or Iranian or? 
SAM  keep selling it because 
GUY  so great about chemical and biological they don’t destroy the 
buildings just kill the  
SAM ideal (293-294) 
In their discussions of violence, Sam and Guy never take into account the human toll 
or trauma caused by American exceptionalism. They focus on the inherent necessity 
of these actions, enacting through progressively more violent actions in the name of 
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security and power. This is similar to Arendt’s description of Eichmann’s behaviour 
when he defended his actions in the holocaust: 
What he said was always the same, expressed in the same words. The longer 
one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was 
closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the 
standpoint of somebody else. No communication was possible with him, not 
because he lied but because he was surrounded by the most reliable of all 
safeguards against the words and the presence of others, and hence against 
reality as such. (49) 
This behaviour is most evident when Sam discusses the various torture methods at 
his disposal. He lists the various methods dispassionately and without wider 
context, by which Rogers argues they are “made the more terrible because clearly 
not the ravings of a lunatic but more like reading from a manual” (161). 
SAM alone 
SAM White double cable whip, iron wreath, beating the soles of the 
feet, put objects in the vagina, put objects in anus, put 
turpentine on testicles, pour water over face, play very loud 
Indonesian music, electric shocks to genitals, tap a dowl 
through the ear to the brain, throw a prisoner out of the 
helicopter, show the prisoner another prisoner being thrown 
out of a helicopter, beating obviously, rape of course, bright 
light, no sleep, simulate an execution so they think up to the 
last second they’re going to die, play tape of women and 
children screaming in next room and tell prisoner its his wife 
and children, sometimes it is, hang up with hands tied behind 
back, pins in eyes, insecticide in hood over the head, cut off 
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breasts, pull out heart, slit throat and pull tongue through, 
sulphuric acid, chop off. (301) 
 
It is worth noting that the majority of Sam and Guy’s discussions implicitly 
centre on foreign policy. Agamben argues that the sovereign’s power relies on being 
able to identify or invent new external threats to the nation state. In doing so the 
sovereign can create a perpetual state of emergency. On the few occasions Guy 
queries why Sam is behaving in this exceptional fashion, Sam replies with pithy 
reasons such as “because democracy”, “because our security” or even more selfishly 
“our economy is the priority here” (273; 274; 286). If Guy pushes Sam to explain in 
more detail, Sam’s reasoning is proven to be out of step with reality. For instance 
when explaining to Guy that America must appropriate local materials from third 
world countries and sell them back to them at inflated prices, he explains that this is 
“because our expenses are so huge like eight billion dollars we spend on cosmetics 
[...] ten on petfood” (290). Guy registers that this is “enough to provide health, food 
and education for the whole of the third world”.  
 
Sam justifies his exceptional behaviour as he is protecting the economy and 
mitigating the ability of other nations to cause him harm. Sam’s constant need for 
security seems to be validated in scene six, when Sam and Guy both witness 9/11: 
 GUY  look out we’re being 
 SAM  no no no the towers 
 GUY  wow 
 SAM  evil 
 GUY  ok? 




These attacks occur only after Sam has already conducted violent acts in the Middle 
East and elsewhere to mitigate terrorist attacks against America. This exchange also 
highlights Sam’s unshakeable belief that those who do not love him are those that 
intend him harm. Yeliz Biber notes that “Sam’s rhetoric throughout the play 
discloses an us/them dichotomy, interwoven with naive revelations of violence and 
a stigmatizing of different ethnic, racial and religious identities” (151).  
 
3. Union Jack and Uncle Sam 
When Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? premiered the character of Guy was 
originally named Jack and subsequently reviewers read the play as an allegory for 
the “special relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom, 
assuming that Sam was coded as Uncle Sam and Jack as Union Jack (Hart; Lett; 
Clapp; Spencer). Subsequently these same reviewers panned the play for being 
simplistic and polemical. Christopher Hart of The Sunday Times said that “George 
[W. Bush] and Tony [Blair] snuggling up together like lovers” is similar to a skit you 
would find on shows such as Spitting Image. Churchill agrees that a play of this 
nature is simplistic commenting she “wouldn’t have bothered to write the play, 
people have assumed I have written” (qtd. in Roberts 269). Churchill has addressed 
this interpretation in the preface to the published version of the play:  
The other character didn’t have a name [...] and when I had to come with up 
one I thought of Jack as an everyday name - Jack of all trades, Jack the lad. 
What I didn’t think, stupidly, was Union Jack, which was the quite sensible 
conclusion, some people jumped to [...] I’d always imagined he would just be 
someone from whatever country the play was done in (ix).  
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In later editions, the character of Jack has been renamed ‘Guy’. In an author’s note 
for the 2008 edition of the script in Plays Four, Churchill writes that she “gave the 
other character the name Jack, thinking it as just a name, but some people 
understandably thought it referred to Union Jack and that Jack was Britain in some 
way” (269). Her use of the word “understandably” suggests that this was at least a 
valid interpretation of her play. At the time of the Royal Court production the 
evidence suggesting that Iraq had possession of weapons of mass destruction had 
been revealed to be incorrect and there was a rising body count of British soldiers 
and Iraqi civilians due to the conflict. Commentators therefore suggested that the 
one-sided relationship between the American Sam and British Jack resonated with a 
disconcerted British public (Soncini 37, Howe Kritzer 53). Soncini notes that after 
Bush’s 2004 re-election campaign the US president had “come to bear an even 
stronger resemblance to Churchill's despotic Sam, dragging his British ally into 
gangrenous conflict with no evident payoff other than honouring a highly 
burdensome alliance (38). During the play, Jack assists with Sam’s acts of violence 
and therefore it is understandable that Jack may have been read as being 
representative of Tony Blair. 
 
However, as Churchill points out, British involvement with American 
exceptionalism has not always been the norm of international politics and is largely a 
recent political development. She says: 
It doesn’t work as Jack = Britain because it doesn’t fit the actual politics - Britain 
didn’t join in Vietnam, and in other ways too it would have to be different if it 
was meant to fit that relationship [... this] goes back over fifty years of event 
and is part of the point, of course - was to point out that America’s been like 
this for a long time, not just under Bush. (qtd. in Roberts 269-270)  
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In an interview with Phillip Roberts she indicated this confusion could have been 
clarified in the author’s note; she mentions she would “hate relying on anyone 
looking at a programme” to comprehend her work (qtd. in Roberts 269). Churchill 
later clarified that the actor who played Guy/Jack should be from the country in 
which the play is being performed, noting that  
what I wanted to write was about the way most people (in Britain, or other 
Western countries, or anywhere, almost) are a bit in love with America, 
whether it’s movies, ice-cream or ideals, and are then implicated in all this stuff 
it does. (qtd. in Roberts 269).  
This explains the play’s original title which was The Man Who Fell In Love with 
America (Churchill ix). When Churchill referred to “most people”, she may have 
meant that citizens of the West see America as a symbol of freedom and democracy, 
unaware of the actions America commits in places such as Nicaragua or Iraq that 
contradict those values. While these people do not literally assist in American 
exceptionalism they are complicit in America’s actions, in the same manner as Guy is 
with Sam.  
 
4. The State of Exception as a Personal Relationship 
If we read Sam and Guy’s lovers’ discourse as a metaphor for the sovereign 
and their citizen during the state of exception, then their relationship evokes Davina 
Bhandar writing on “the new normal”. Bhandar asserts that citizens are controlled 
through “anxiety, fear, and trauma” which allows the sovereign to create an 
“alternative sets of norms, values and systems of management and control, [where] 
the foundational elements of the democratic society are increasingly undermined 
and simply do not inform basic expectations of the everyday” (263). In short, in 
order to still remain citizens, or in Agamben’s terms bios, legitimate life, citizens 
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must subject themselves to increasingly more controlling forms of state governance 
“into an unremitting acceptance of a way of life that does not hold promise, but is 
rather continually resituated through the experience and the repetitive act of trauma 
or loss” (275).  
 
In the opening dialogue, these terms of engagement, wherein Guy must 
subject himself to Sam’s control, are made clear. Guy and Sam are on a date having 
met previously in a bar. Guy is happily married with children; however, within 
minutes on his second date with Sam, Guy resolves to leave his wife and children. 
Guy asks: 
GUY  go where did you say you? 
SAM  anywhere you wouldn’t? 
GUY   do when we get there? 
SAM   things you won’t do? (272) 
Sam demands total commitment from Guy, a readiness to go and do anything that 
Sam requires of him. Churchill’s central argument is that to be a citizen of an 
exceptional state is similar to being in an abusive relationship. Sam and Guy’s 
relationship is defined by emotional blackmail, verbal battery and an 
uncompromising subscription to Sam’s wants and beliefs. Sam demands Guy’s 
absolute loyalty implicating him in Sam’s acts of destruction. Guy is at first too 
fearful to protest against Sam’s actions and Guy seems unable to leave Sam. 
 
The behaviour of Sam, or a similar sovereign, begs the question why Guy, or a 
similar citizen, would ‘get into bed’ with Sam to begin with. Churchill outlines this 
at the beginning of scene two when Guy and Sam discuss their love of American 
national identity which is constructed through cultural and historical references: 
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GUY  music, I can’t get enough of 
SAM  country or 
GUY  when I listen to Bessie Smith or 
SAM  Dylan, Bing Crosby, Eminem 
GUY  because what rock does 
SAM  even Jingle Bells can suddenly 
GUY  the snow and all 
SAM  mountains like you’ve never 
GUY  size of it all, there’s so many different 
SAM  sea to shining 
GUY  freedom to 
SAM  Ellis Island 
GUY  or even just go to the movies and eat popcorn 
SAM  pursuit of happiness (273)  
Guy has a firm idea of what America, ergo Sam, represents - Bob Dylan, eating 
popcorn and listening to ‘Jingle Bells’ - and presumably, keeping these values safe 
justifies Sam’s exceptionalism. More importantly, Sam is synonymous with freedom 
and the pursuit of happiness. It is important here to note the etymology of Uncle 
Sam. Uncle Sam traditionally represents the government of the United States, as seen 
in Montgomery Flagg’s infamous army recruitment poster, while the goddess, 
Columbia, generally references the nation. Therefore Sam is not the embodiment of 
the American nation, but rather its political system and is co-opting national myths 
and cultural values for exceptional purposes. Guy’s perception of Sam is framed by 
these cultural and historical references to what America represents and, initially, he 
is willing to condone Sam’s exceptionalism and believe his fear-mongering tactics. 
At no point does Guy offer his own interpretation of events; rather he simply repeats 
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what Sam has just said. He occasionally registers when something makes him 
uncomfortable but even then he does not suggest why this is the case and quickly 
withdraws his complaints when requested. The power and security that Sam offers 
is also an attraction. Guy claims after assisting Sam for the first time that he has 
never had “so much fun in my life [...] god must have so much fun” (279). Sam 
reasons that this is from “being powerful and being on the side of good”. Phillip 
Roberts argues that Guy is “intoxicated by close proximity to power” and the 
benefits that it brings (158). The power is so intoxicating that Guy abandons his 
family, job and all his familiar surroundings to be with Sam, ignoring possible 
human rights abuses or signs of danger coming from Sam.  
 
The imbalance of power is seen keenly in the conversational style of the duo. 
Rogers notes that “Sam does not feel the need to explain in detail what is being done 
in his name. Guy [...] mainly echoes or rephrases. The two are locked together in [...] 
a sort of linguistic dance without end” (161). As the play progresses, Guy’s identity 
and way of life has been subsumed by Sam to such a degree that Soncini observes 
that Sam and Guy require fewer and fewer words to speak as they become closer 
and closer to being one entity; they “come to an extreme form of stichomythia in 
which language is entirely divested of its relational components” (45): 
GUY  carbon 
SAM  can’t see it in the air, so 
GUY  Kyoto? 
SAM  price of electricity in California 
GUY  but 
SAM  nuclear 
GUY  danger 
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SAM  efficient 
GUY  waste 
SAM  solution 
GUY  Iran? (308) 
Guy is subsumed in Sam’s identity, which assumes that Guy has fallen prey to the 
“New Normal”. The men simply build “on each other’s utterances, [...] speaking 
almost as one rather than engaging in dialogue” (Howe Kritzer 516). The 
relationship Guy shares with Sam becomes ‘the new normal’ of the state of 
exception, wherein the exceptional behaviour of the sovereign becomes the norm. By 
the end of scene three Guy has become party to this new normal declaring that ‘“the 
children dead from sanctions we don't count that because” (283). The reasoning 
behind why the dead children are not counted is left hanging; Guy is never informed 
as to why they do not count civilian deaths, only that they do not.  
 
As the play progresses Sam’s interest in Guy wanes; he becomes less patient, 
less understanding. When Sam talks directly to Guy he only demands more loyalty, 
demonstrated through performing increasingly more extreme actions, such as 
exporting anthrax to Iraq. If Guy queries any exceptional act that Sam asks of him, 
Sam interprets this as insubordination and violently chastises him: 
 SAM  fuck is wrong with you? 
 GUY  trying to grasp the numbers that’s all, I 
 SAM   do things on large scale 
 GUY  yes 
 SAM  way of life 
 GUY  yes 
 SAM  you chose 
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 GUY  yes 
 SAM  can fuck off now if 
 GUY  no 
 SAM  yes fuck off now because 
 GUY  no please no 
 SAM  commitment (290-291) 
 
For Sam love is synonymous with loyalty. If Guy questions Sam then it means 
that Guy does not love Sam. Sam is uncompromising; demanding more and more 
love. After stipulating that Guy must leave his wife and children for him, Sam also 
demands that Guy eliminate any other distractions to simply “just cut off everybody 
and not even speak” (285). Their relationship is not open to negotiation. Sam offers 
Guy a simple choice: to agree with Sam and to love Sam or to disagree and to not 
love Sam. Guy can break off this arrangement at any point but its insidious nature 
means that he will not have Sam’s power or security. Biber comments that their 
relationship is based upon an unsaid threat, which “obliges Guy to love and support 
[Sam], because if he does not, Sam will have to position Guy in the same group as 
‘the evildoers who hate me’” (151). Guy briefly leaves Sam at the end of scene six. 
Howe Kritzer comments that, despite Guy’s best effort to “support and encourage” 
Sam, after seeing the ‘man behind the curtain’, Guy “cannot help being appalled and 
sickened” by Sam’s actions (517). However, he returns believing that life outside 
Sam’s protection is filled with danger and insecurity. The conditions for Sam taking 
him back are unclear but hint at a life of draconian rule: 
SAM  take you back I need to know if 
 GUY  try to 
 SAM  total commitment or there’s no 
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 GUY   I realise 
 SAM  capable 
 GUY  can 
 SAM  promise 
 GUY  love 
 SAM  nightmare here 
 GUY  yes 
 SAM  not going to be happy don’t 
 GUY  no I don’t expect 
 SAM  so what you 
 GUY  can’t live 
 SAM  no you can’t, can’t 
 GUY  no I can’t 
 SAM  ok then (302) 
The willingness of Guy to be subjected to an anomic life mirrors the willingness of 
American citizens after the terrorist attacks of September 11th to be subjected to the 
Patriot Act, which authorised the monitoring of phone calls, bag checks and 
increased domestic security. Howe Kritzer comments that “For Sam, who can 
command submission, Guy’s capitulation means nothing unless he can demonstrate 
total commitment” (517).  
 
By the play’s conclusion, the slowly rising couch has reached its apex. Rogers 
comments that “the ending literally leaves the play in the air. Guy has left once, and 
returned. He can’t love Sam, and can’t leave Sam. And Sam demands, like a child, 
limitless love” (161). Sam and Guy have reached what would appear a deadlock. 
However, Guy has demonstrated such loyalty to Sam, his life is literally suspended 
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like Agamben’s homo sacer. He can no longer determine his own destiny; he has an 
illusion of choice, but ultimately must subjugate himself to Sam’s exceptional 
demands or fall from the height of the couch into the darkness below. The final line 
of the play is spoken by Sam who demands that Guy “love me love me, you have to 
love me, you” (309). Soncini likens this choice to Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, 
especially the concluding scene of Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? where Guy has to 
make the choice to end the relationship or not; like Didi and Gogo, Guy wants to 
leave but knows that he cannot (41). The looping of Sam’s final line amplifies his 
demanding nature and leaves open for the audience to imagine the new demands, 
the new normal, to which Guy must subject himself to love Sam.  
 
Waters describes the play’s ending as “a wilful submission to the dictates of 
‘commitment’ in the Sartrean fashion” (Waters 140). Like the characters of Sartre’s 
No Exit, Guy is in an inescapable hell, banal in fashion. Similarly, like Joseph Garcin 
in Jean-Paul Sartre’s play, Guy is left with a similar thought of "Eh bien, 
continuons...” ["Well then, let's continue..."] (Sartre 95). The play’s title then 
references how drunk, or how removed from reality, a twenty-first century citizen 
must be to continue to love their sovereign, whether that be from the deception on 
the sovereign’s behalf or consigning themselves to a life of political insouciance. At 
the conclusion of the play, Guy is suspended in the air with nowhere to go, and has 
been plied with enough ‘drink’ by Sam that he is left with no option but to start 
pouring himself another one.  
 
Kritzer critiques Churchill’s metaphoric device of the relationship between Sam 
and Guy as it fails “to convey the necessity or urgency of change” (57). She argues 
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that the play does not invite audiences to critically reflect on their own existence as 
Churchill 
gives Guy neither a basis for his self-annihilating behavior nor the leavening of 
more endearing qualities that would enable acceptance of him as an ordinary 
man. Furthermore, Guy excludes the audience and the rest of the world by 
focusing all his attention on Sam, never reflecting on or explaining his choices. 
(58) 
I would counter this argument by suggesting that Churchill does briefly address 
Guy’s attraction to Sam. Guy as discussed earlier is enamored with the power that 
Sam wields. Through Sam’s co-opting of pop culture Sam is seen as an analagous 
with freedom, democracy and “Bob Dylan”. While the play progresses, Guy is made 
aware of the various acts of violence his nation (Sam) conducts; however, Guy also 
learns that for him to stop ‘loving’ Sam would mean that he would no longer enjoy 
the security that Sam provides. Like Agamben’s homo sacer Guy’s life is literally 
suspended, due to the slowly rising couch he is seated upon, by the end of the play. 
The conditions of living in a state of exception means that the citizen is powerless to 
articulate the situation they find themselves in and has no legal recourse to reign in 
their sovereign.  
 
The open ending of Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? is similar to the open 
ending of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, wherein after being released from 
prison Winston feels “the long-hoped-for bullet [...] entering his brain” (342). Orwell 
leaves this open as to whether this is a literal bullet or rather Winston achieving 
victory over himself, by ignoring his own critical thought and succumbing to the 
party’s doublethink. Orwell’s conclusion is that the only victory under these 
conditions is complete submission or death. Guy has the same choice, to reject Sam 
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and become part of “the evildoers who hate [Sam]” or, like Winston, to love every 
part of his sovereign 
He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what 
kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless 
misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two 
gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, 
everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory 
over himself. He loved Big Brother. (Orwell 342) 
Similar to Nineteen Eighty-Four, Guy’s choice is simply an illusion; either choice is a 
form of death and the suspended nature of the couch conceivably makes leaving 






SMASH THE MIRRORS 




In this post-truth world we are all vexed about how to grasp onto reality and 
to the truth. This thesis has traced the contemporary phenomena of post-truth 
politics to the political environment of 2003, which Naomi Klein termed the “Year of 
the Fake” due to the duplicitous nature of politicians and the tactics they used to 
enforce or disrupt the public record, specifically in relation to the Invasion of Iraq. 
This environment was unpacked using Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical framework of 
the State of Exception to understand how post-truth politics operates.  
 
Agamben argues that in a State of Exception the sovereigns determine their 
own exception to the rules that traditionally dictate how democratic societies 
operate. For Agamben however this represents a constitutional crisis, as the State of 
Exception is not something that is codified by law or legalised by the judiciary; it is 
power taken by the sovereign and not endorsed by any other part of a democratic 
structure. This crisis creates a contradiction where the sovereign is therefore able to 
act in line with the judicial order by passing bills or enacting extraordinary political 
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powers, but is not bound by law. The actions have the force of law, but cannot be 
understood in legal terms. Those individuals who are negatively affected by the 
sovereigns exceptional actions Agamben refers to as homo sacer.  
 
The State of Exception was connected to state lying and deception by arguing 
that, in the same way, a sovereign could behave exceptionally through making 
claims that have the force of truth which are not necessarily truthful. Like their 
actions, their claims to truth lie outside the usual systems for evaluating their 
behaviour. For the sovereign, being able to give information the force of truth is a 
powerful tool for controlling the populace while pursuing hidden agendas. In this 
manner, the sovereign’s exceptional act of lying allows them to pursue further 
exceptional acts. Relating these ideas to Davina Bhandar’s ideas on ‘the new normal’ 
in which citizens are controlled through systems of lying, fear and anxiety, this 
thesis established that most citizens in the twenty-first century are homo sacer, as 
being deceived by their sovereigns not only transgresses their rights but also 
suspends their lives, disconnected from reality.  
  
The thesis further argued that the state of exception is an inherently 
performative phenomena as it relies on the generation of grand imagery, the 
undertaking of liminal roles (with the sovereign being betwixt and between 
democratic rule and autocrat), while the exception is also a liminal space allowing 
the sovereign to redefine others roles on a whim. This discussion further highlighted 
how the theatre exists in a state of exception and this theatrical exception is being co-
opted by politicians. As previously discussed Brutus can kill Caesar on the stage and 
we simultaneously understand that the actor who plays Brutus is not guilty of any 
crime, but at the same time that actor is Brutus and has committed an atrocious act. 
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Theatre, to function, depends on the audience investing in this paradox where reality 
and masquerade coincide. Politicians in a post-truth world are asking the same of 
their citizens where doctored files can pass as evidence of mass destruction, 
whitewashed tribunals can be founts of truth and global atrocities can be passed off 
as enacting global security. 
 
This leads to one of the primary questions of this thesis: how can playwrights 
critique the actions of exceptional politicians without being guilty of the same 
exceptional behaviour of the politicians they wish to critique? Subsequently, this 
framework has then been applied to three plays written during the Iraq war period: 
Stuff Happens by David Hare, Justifying War by Richard Norton-Taylor and Drunk 
Enough to Say I Love You? by Caryl Churchill. Agamben’s theories on the state of 
exception were used to frame how these plays have depicted exceptionalism on 
stage and how these playwrights have foregrounded their own exceptional 
relationship to the truth. All three plays depict political leaders as Agambean 
sovereigns who deceive their citizens, who in some form or other take on the role of 
the homo sacer, the man excluded from rights. The sovereigns in these three plays are 
seen as operating outside the laws and rules that are meant to provide checks and 
balances to their power, while their citizens’ rights are transgressed.  
 
Stuff Happens executes this through revealing the backroom dealings behind 
the diplomatic process leading to the invasion of Iraq. Bush and his cabinet’s mission 
is built around selling the invasion of Iraq at any cost, not revealing their hidden 
agendas and applying a form of coercive diplomacy to achieve the ends they need. 
Justifying War recreates a space where the exception is enforced, establishing and 
enforcing the narratives of the sovereign while silencing citizens’ voices and 
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excluding them from spaces of justice. Finally, Drunk Enough to Say I Love You? 
depicts the sovereign as primarily focused on achieving their own objectives and 
security for their own end. Their behaviour is bullying and while language is veiled 
and obtuse which prevents direct access to the truth, everything is broken down to 
concepts and jargon. In exchange for their protection they demand absolute loyalty 
from their citizens. All three plays discussed in this thesis depict the sovereign as 
shaping reality as they wish it to be, not as it is, and deception and exceptional 
promotion of their own agendas are seen as a way of achieving these ends, whether 
that be manipulating the public into supporting an illegitimate war, suppressing 
counter narratives to the government’s agenda or reframing their violent exceptional 
behaviour as spreading democracy to the world.  
 
I earlier mentioned that the post-truth world is vexed by what is truth and 
what is reality. Theatre has attempted to fill that void and this thesis has provided 
three different approaches to combating this void. One way that theatre found to 
address these “profound anxieties” of the post-truth era was documentary theatre, 
which was seen as a perfect way for audience “to undertake a collective act of 
bearing witness” to how they were being deceived by their political elites (Megson 
371). But documentary theatre has proved unreliable and this was seen with the two 
documentary plays examined in this thesis. Justifying War was hampered in terms of 
shining a light upon the true state of affairs as Norton-Taylor’s play recreated a 
tribunal that was dismissed as a whitewash in the government’s favour, proving that 
documentary theatre is only as powerful as the events that it dramatises. Stuff 
Happens attempted to become a more revelatory piece of theatre by including pieces 
that were part of the public record, as well as staging scenes that were entirely part 
of the imagination of its author, David Hare. Stuff Happens is an extremely 
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compromised piece of theatre, due to Hare creating his own “exceptions to the rules” 
of documentary theatre. As Little argues documentary theatre exists on a spectrum 
between the highly ethical and the highly aesthetic and these extremes do not seem 
to be a way to engage with the post-truth world. Churchill, however, provides 
another way of coming at this problem through her work’s very dramaturgy and 
unreliability. She purposefully disrupts her work’s connection to the real, which not 
only allows the audience to be aware of her own exceptional relationship to the truth 
but also depicts the wider context of exceptionalism as opposed to just focussing on 
singular events like Norton-Taylor and Hare. Her work can comment on reality, 
without having the responsibility of needing to represent reality.  
 
In concluding this thesis, I wish to return to Harold Pinter’s Nobel Prize 
Lecture “Art, Truth and Politics” wherein he outlines the difference between truth in 
art and truth in politics. He outlines these two forms of truth using two personas 
that he takes on: that of the artist and that of the citizen. As an artist the truth is an 
unfixed commodity and malleable art is a place where “there are no hard 
distinctions between what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and 
what is false” (3). However, as a citizen he must acknowledge that there is a fixed 
truth, one that is hard to access due to politicians mediating the truth for their 
political ends (3). He warns that politicians are now using truth like an artist uses 
truth, where there is no such thing as one fixed truth, wherein “sometimes you feel 
you have the truth of a moment in your hand, then it slips through your fingers and 
is lost” (4). Truth in our everyday lives is becoming ever more elusive and for Pinter, 
the only way for citizens to reverse this trend is through “unflinching, unswerving, 




How then, does an artist oppose the post-truth environment? Pinter likens 
this environment to “when we look into a mirror we think the image that confronts 
us is accurate. But move a millimetre and the image changes. We are actually 
looking at a never-ending range of reflections” (20). An artist could identify what the 
one fixed truth, or in this case reflection, is, but how does one identify what the one 
fixed truth is, in such an environment? How does one determine the objective truth 
of reality? As seen with Hare’s Stuff Happens, to claim that you have privileged 
access to the truth is a precarious position to be in, as questions arise regarding your 
sources and your evidence of these claims. Pinter argues that the artist’s relationship 
to the truth is a “highly vulnerable, almost naked activity” and to claim otherwise is 
to “lie - in which case of course you have constructed your own protection and, it 
could be argued, become a politician” (19). Pinter’s dichotomy between the artist 
and the citizen strikes a chord with George Orwell’s 1948 essay Writers and Leviathan, 
in which Orwell argued that in “an age of state control” writers must balance their 
duties as citizens against the imagination’s natural resistance to the “invasion” of 
politics (407-408). Writers should not shirk their duties as citizens to be politically 
active, but they must distinguish between their “political and literary loyalties” 
(412). Orwell concedes that in ages of state tyranny it is hard for writers to keep their 
minds free of politics. He points out that “to yield subjectively, not merely to a party 
machine, but even to a group ideology, is to destroy yourself as a writer” (415). 
 
Pinter’s solution to this hall of mirrors in which artists find themselves is 
simple. He argues that if an artist wishes to use their art to combat the exceptional 
acts of politicians, who bend and twist the truth to their will, they must “smash the 
mirror – for it is on the other side of that mirror that the truth stares at us” (21). Here, 
the truth for Pinter is not an objective truth, but rather a truth distorted by political 
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elites. Artists and writers should “smash the mirrors” to remind us we live in this 
hall of mirrors, and with each shift things look different. The audience is still left 
with the problem of truth, but is in a better place to seek it, wary of the exceptional 
linguistics of politicians.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate the political efficacy of the 
three plays analysed here within. The aim of this thesis has largely focused on ethics 
and how artists can avoid further complicating representations of reality in their 
work in a post-truth world. But it would seem that from an ethical perspective, the 
most effective ways for the theatre to combat this state of affairs is not to declare 
what the definitive truth is, like Hare, which is shaky ground to stand upon, but 
rather to point out how the truth can be a malleable and unfixed concept, a result 
that could be argued was achieved in both Norton-Taylor’s and Churchill’s work. In 
this post-truth world, as expounded by Pinter, artists should equip citizens with the 
clarity and tools to “define the real truth in our lives” and to restore “what is so 
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